

UNITED NATIONS REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN

The following are excerpts reproduced from the UN report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by Mr Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights.

Situation of Human rights in Afghanistan

A. Outline of the governmental structure and the consequences for the human rights situation

During his visit to the different provinces in Afghanistan, the Special Rapporteur studied to the extent possible the structure of the government and the administration of justice in order to gain insight into the situation concerning the enjoyment of the most fundamental human rights in the country, such as the right to personal liberty and security, the right to life, the right to a fair trial, as well as enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.

The Koran is the principal source of law in the country. However, the judicial system and penal authorities are not unified in Afghanistan. It was the objective of the Special Rapporteur to acquaint himself with the status of the judicial system and find out whether different provinces or regions had any connection with the authorities in Kabul. The answer was affirmative only when the members of these authorities belonged to the same political groupings as those holding power in Kabul. If this were not the case there were no links with the capital. There is no central authority governing the judicial system. The same principle was valid as regards the security system. The regional authorities had no instances for appeal. The competences were limited to the regional level and judges were appointed by the regional authorities.

With regard to foreign policy as well, some provincial authorities handled the external affairs of a given region. A number of provinces have a separate diplomatic service representing the interests of a specific region. This accounts for the impression of a highly decentralized system for which there is no legal foundation.

The special rapporteur mentions these examples in order to show that although the notion may be dear to people who love their country, Afghanistan does not have an effective central government. In a critical approach to the matter, a jurist may ask whether the State of Afghanistan still exists or if the country is in the process of being dismembered. This dismembering is such that the real administrative units are not the more or less clearly delineated provinces but regions which at times group several provinces and which are either governed by strong leaders or by councils (shuras) composed of some of the coalition parties which exist in a fragmented manner in Kabul. One may consider as a factual reality that there is no Afghan government in Kabul, although there is a State President. Rather, there are regional governments which exercise their power through regional armies within the territory which is called Afghanistan.

If one considers an army as a particular symbol of the sovereignty of a State, there is no State army in Afghanistan in spite of the fact that armed people in some regions are wearing military uniforms with different insignia. At first glance, they resemble the former army and the former sarandio (policemen), but closer inspection reveals that there is no army under a central command but that there are armies belonging to different provinces and regions or, as in Kabul, armies of different political parties or factions.

During his visit to the area in September 1994, the Special Rapporteur was unable to visit Kabul and the surrounding region owing to the impossibility to travel caused by a lack of security. Nevertheless, while overflying the city at night, the Special Rapporteur and his team were able to observe the rocketing and artillery battle which was confirmed to the pilots by the personnel at the Kabul airport control tower. The Special Rapporteur last visited the city in September 1993, when he met several leaders of political parties, including President Rabbani, Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud and the First Deputy Prime Minister affiliated with the Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) political party.

Human rights situation in the Northern part of the country

The power of General Dostom, the Governor and military commander of the northern region of Afghanistan whose capital Mazar-i-Sharif, extends over several provinces. As head of the Islamic National Movement of Afghanistan, he is advised by the council (shura) composed of representatives of the principle Afghan political parties which are also represented in Kabul. However, it appears that the region has no links, neither administration nor judicial, with the capital. The council headed by General Dostom tries to keep law and order and steer the region away from armed conflicts.

The Kabul Government has no say in matters concerning the northern part of Afghanistan. It has no right to appoint anyone in either the judiciary or the administration. The council of the Islamic National Movement of Afghanistan is the only body which has the right to appoint officials.

The judicial system appears to be well organized. However, there are no contacts with Kabul. The judges appear mainly to apply Islamic law. Legislation dating back to the time of President Najibullah which is not incompatible with Islamic law and whose texts are thought to be in conformity with the Koran is also applied. The judges are not appointed by the authorities in Kabul but by General Dostom.

The Special Rapporteur visited the prison in Mazar-i-Sharif. The prison corresponds to the local standards and the conditions of detention appear to be satisfactory.

Human rights situation in the western part of the country

In Herat, the Special Rapporteur was once again able to meet with the Governor, Mr. Ismail Khan.... Although security is not guaranteed in some of the surrounding areas, the security in Herat would appear to be satisfactory and only members of the armed forces carry weapons. The Special Rapporteur was nevertheless informed about the conscription of men aged 19-39, with no exemptions, which partly accounted for an alleged desertion rate of 30 per cent.

While in Herat, the Special Rapporteur was able to visit the local prison and discuss the judicial system, which appears to be quite independent from Kabul. The Koran is the principle source of law. Laws which were applied during the previous governments have been retained only in so far they are in conformity with Islamic law.

With regard to the cultural monuments of Herat, the special Rapporteur received a report based on a visit to the city which was carried out in September 1994 and which left

both positive and negative impressions. A number of cultural monuments in Herat reportedly sustained little damage. Nevertheless the Musalla complex was described as the saddest example of the most recent assaults on Herat's historical monuments. The Park-i-Bihzad, which used to be a beautiful park in the 1960's is now reported to be an open, dusty desert. The once verdant Takht-i-Safar garden is now a barren hill. A number of minarets at the Gawhar Shad mausoleum, and the Sultan Hussain Baiqara complex were directly hit by rockets but are still standing.

The Special Rapporteur was able to visit the Herat prison and speak with a number of detainees. Their conditions of detention appeared to be in conformity with those prevailing in detention centres in the rest of the country.

E. Human rights situation in the south-eastern part of the country

The Special Rapporteur was able to visit Kandahar, which is governed principally by two powerful commanders.... The Governor does not appear to exercise control over the entire province. The part of Kandahar which is under the authority of Commander Lalai has no factual relations with Kabul. Although the need for a central government was stressed, the local authorities were currently working on the elaboration of an administrative structure which would be comprised of two to four representatives of each district, depending on its size.

Human rights situation in the eastern part of the country

The Special Rapporteur had a detailed discussion with the representatives of the judiciary whose competence extends to the Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman provinces.... The president of the court is appointed by the president of the regional council (shura). The Special Rapporteur was informed that a list of judges had been sent for approval to Kabul but that no answer had been received.

The Special Rapporteur was able to visit the prison in Jalalabad where conditions of detention correspond to the average conditions prevailing in prisons in Afghanistan.

Specific human rights questions

The visit to several cities in Afghanistan undertaken by the Special Rapporteur in September 1994 brought him into contact with different organizations dealing with human rights and related issues. Specific problems, some of which had not been discussed much previously, were brought to the fore. There are a number of specific human rights problems in Afghanistan which shed light on the overall situation in the region. They can roughly be divided into general problems which have an incidence on the enjoyment of human rights and human rights violations regarding specific persons or groups.

One of the principal problems in Afghanistan is the insecurity which prevails in many parts of the country. An additional problem is the question of mines which affects the right to life and influences the willingness of refugees to return. In view of the number of mines which have been laid in Afghanistan, de-mining is a slow process, although de-mining operations have fulfilled and even surpassed their yearly targets.

As regards specific problem concerning individuals or groups of persons, there is in particular the problem of the status of women in Afghanistan, especially those living in refugee camps or camps for internally displaced persons. There is also the issue of amnesty. Political amnesty was proclaimed at the very beginning of the Islamic Government by President Mojaddidi, in conformity with the will of

other party leaders who had decided to proclaim a general amnesty. The Special Rapporteur has the impression that today, after a relatively peaceful transfer of power, persons who had served in one capacity for the other during the Najibullah Government as officers, civil servants or simple party members were now persecuted and killed by commandos belonging to the revolutionary parties. Some factual examples may help to illustrate the situation.

One of the most vulnerable groups of human being in an armed conflict, and in particular in the type of non-international conflict such as the one which is currently taking place in Afghanistan, is women and children. Their interests are not actively represented at the different councils and gatherings such as the one which was recently held in Herat, where not a single woman was present. They are also victims of different types of brutality. It has also been stated that during the struggle for national liberation, no one recognized the merits of women who made a considerable contribution to it. In the devastated areas of Kabul, in camps for displaced persons or as refugees, women have often been reduced to begging in order to feed their families. The Special Rapporteur was asked specifically to look into the fate of widows who find themselves in a particularly vulnerable situation and who are believed to number 1.5 million after the war. There are also innumerable cases of women who were not only ill-treated but also raped.

After the almost complete destruction of Kabul University, of which the Special rapporteur was an eyewitness, professors and other teaching staff have been left with no facilities to carry out their work. The material means such as books, journals or laboratories and the financial means required for normal university life have disappeared as a result of the destruction and looting of which the Special Rapporteur was also an eyewitness. Some university activities have been transferred from Kabul to the University of Jalalabad. It is estimated that some 200 professors have left the country recently, many of whom have sought refuge in Pakistan. Even the possibility to contribute to the educational activities in Jalalabad is difficult for professors living in Pakistan. The Special Rapporteur was informed that although the same professors take the same minibus from Peshawar twice a week and cross the border at Torkham in order to teach in Jalalabad, they have to go through a lengthy bureaucratic procedure in order to obtain a written permission from the Pakistani authorities each time. Afghanistan is losing generations of academically trained young people as a result of the present situation.

The amnesty decree which was proclaimed in the first days of the Islamic government gave the impression that the way for a common understanding had been paved. However, the Special Rapporteur was informed that a number of persons who held positions during the previous regime or persons belonging to rival groups have died in suspicious circumstances in the course of 1994. He was also informed that persons were afraid of receiving threats if they held political opinions which differed from those held by the parties or groups in power, especially since political parties have become armed organizations.

Situation of refugees and displaced persons

Ever since he was appointed to study the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the Special Rapporteur has expressed the opinion that the situation of refugees constituted per se a complex human rights problem.

The policy concerning Afghan refugees of the [neighbouring] Governments concerned and of the competent international organizations began to change after the establishment of the Islamic government in Afghanistan. Although more than a million refugees have returned since the change of government, some 3 million Afghan refugees continue to live in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The rate of repatriation which took place in 1992 and at the beginning of 1993 did not continue. It was less the fear of mines than political instability, the renewed fighting, the lack of security and the absence of an economic infrastructure which kept the remaining refugees from returning to their homes. The year 1994 has been described as a bad one for repatriation. By mid-September 1994, a total of 126,000 refugees had returned from both Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The host countries began to change their policy towards Afghan refugees.

Although the conditions of the encashment programme remained the same, Governments started implementing policies aimed at encouraging the refugees to return. A number of refugee camps in Pakistan were closed. The assistance provided to refugees is geared towards creating conditions in Afghanistan that would incite refugees to return. It is estimated that more than 1 million Afghan refugees still reside in Pakistan. It is estimated that some 1.8 million Afghan refugees live in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The fighting which broke out with new intensity in Afghanistan on 1 January 1994 prompted the Pakistani authorities to close the border with Afghanistan on 12 January 1994, with the exception of persons with valid visas and travel documents and humanitarian cases.





The assistance provided by UNHCR is increasingly concentrating on the most vulnerable groups, such as women, children and the sick. The policy of UNHCR is also geared towards rendering Afghan refugees increasingly self-reliant.

The Special Rapporteur has witnessed the plight of the some 184,000 internally displaced people who, having fled the continuous rocketing and shelling in Kabul, are now living in the Sar Shahi camp located in a barren area some 20 kilometres from Jalalabad, in Nangahar Province, where facilities are provided by UNOCHA, UNHCR and non-governmental humanitarian organizations. Despite the provision of some basic services including health care and schooling, there are hygiene problems in the camp, caused by a poor water and electricity supply. Recently, new arrivals have had to survive without shelter or any other type of assistance. Numerous cases of diarrhoea, malaria and malnutrition have been registered.



CONSUMER NOTE

Note cards with black & white sketches by Afghan artist Ashraf Dastagirzada are available in 10 designs, 5 of which are shown here. The assortment of 10, with envelopes (which are a standard size so if you mess one up, it's easy to replace) are available from the artist, Apt. 7H, 135 East 50th St., New York, NY 10022. The set of 10 is \$5.00 + \$2.00 for postage & handling. Make checks payable to Ashraf Dastagirzada.



Mohammadi describes "neutrals" peace plan

Mawlawi Nabi Mohammadi, the leader of Harakat Inqilab Islami, who had come to Kabul as a member of a peace delegation became president of the Commission for Convening of Loya Jirga. This decision of Mohammadi surprised Afghan observers and angered the anti-state coalition.

Giving an interview to Itihad Islami newspaper, Nabi Mohammadi explained why he accepted this post despite claiming to be neutral in the current fighting:

"We, the three neutral parties, Harakat Inqilab, Harakat Islami of Mohsini and NIFA of Pir Gailani, decided to work for peace in the country. Originally, we proposed that President Rabbani should transfer power to the Leadership Council comprised of leaders of the nine Mujahideen parties. The leadership Council should have convened a Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga and the leadership Council should have formed a transition government for a period of two years. The Loya Jirga, the leadership Council and the provisional government was supposed to form an Islamic army and to hand over the security in Kabul to the local Mujahideen. It was also supposed to clear the government machinery from the presence of communists and pave way for holding general elections.


"To discuss this plan with Prof. Rabbani, we sent a delegation to Kabul but he refused to hand over power to the Leadership Council arguing that the Hal-o-Aqd Council had ended the Leadership Council's role.

"Then, we came to Kabul and presented a new peace formula to President Rabbani. This formula envisages holding a Loya Jirga comprised of religious scholars, elders and Mujahideen commanders from all regions of Afghanistan. The Loya Jirga will decide about the future of the country. President Rabbani accepted this proposal. We decided to form a commission to prepare for implementa-

tion of this plan. This commission should include representatives from government, opposition and the neutral parties.

"I was made the head of this commission and Shaikh Mohsini and Gailani its secretaries. I wanted to have two deputies, one from the government side and one from the opposition. The government side introduced Prof. Sayyaf.

"We wrote a letter asking



Mawlawi Nabi Mohammadi

Hikmatyar for a meeting. This letter was signed by the three of us. Hikmatyar asked us to go to Charasyab but Mohsini refused to go there because Hezb and Harakat Islami were engaged in fighting each other at that time.

"We sent another message to Hikmatyar asking him to receive one of us but he refused to do so. When we

asked him to send his representative, he replied we could meet his representatives in Peshawar. Mohsini, Gailani and Seddiqi, were sent to Peshawar. The delegation was supposed to return to Kabul but it did not come. The commission members became tired of waiting and we had to open the commission's meetings. We decided to send another delegation to Peshawar. The delegation met with Pir Gailani and Mohsini but returned empty-handed.

"I want to meet with Mahmoud Mesturi and tell him if he wants to solve the problem, he should not follow a separate path. He should support our efforts because we both want to convene a Loya Jirga. There is need for preparatory work to convene the Loya Jirga. We should cooperate in this stage. I want Mesturi to carry out his peace mission inside Afghanistan. He should support the peace efforts initiated by Afghans.


"Some of the Afghans that he invited to the Quetta meeting are not acceptable to the majority of Afghans because they do not have the right credentials for this job.

"The Majority of Afghans do not accept Junbish as player of Afghan politics. No one has recognized Junbish as a legitimate party. Dostum fought against the Mujahideen all the way from Hairatan, a town on Uzbekistan border, to Torkham, a town on Pakistan border. He should not have been forgiven in the first place because he is a butcher of the Afghan people. It will be a mistake to give him any role in the future of Afghanistan.

"I ask Hikmatyar and other opposition leaders not to insist on the participation of Dostum in the peace process at this stage. Once the Loya Jirga is formed, this issue could be discussed there.

"I have committed myself to the peace process for the sake of Islam and the Afghan people. I don't support either Prof. Rabbani or Hikmatyar and consider myself as neutral.

Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman went on trial this week in Manhattan. The following are excerpts from an article by Richard Bernstein in the NYT 1/8:



John Solomonay/The New York Times

Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in Brooklyn in 1993.

Trail of the Sheik

Mr. Abdel Rahman spent eight months in Cairo's vast 12th century Citadel Prison, where he was detained without charges for his remarks. After his release, he taught at a girls' school in the southern city of Asyut. Then he went to Saudi Arabia for a three-year teaching stint. There, according to some Egyptians familiar with the cleric, he made contact with other figures coming into prominence as leaders of a renaissance form of militant Islam, as well as wealthy Saudis who later provided the movement with money.

Equally important, Mr. Abdel Rahman benefited from a shift in the Egyptian Government's attitude toward Islam as President Sadat tried to enlist Islamic support in his contest against the Egyptian left.

"Omar Abdel Rahman was used by the Government against us," Lofti Suleyman, a medical doctor who was a socialist and a Nasserite activist, said in an interview in Fayoum. "The Government called us enemies of Islam, agents of the Soviet Union and infidels. The Government wrote communiques, and Omar Abdel Rahman signed them."

Some in Egypt say that Mr. Sadat made the same mistake that the United States later made regarding Muslim militants in Afghanistan. Mr. Sadat tried to enlist their support in Egyptian politics, strengthening them in the process, only to have the clerics turn against him later. In later years, the United States supported radical Muslims in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and, with the war over, found that it had armed and supplied a force that was inimical to it. In both instances, Mr. Abdel Rahman was at the center of the action.

Where there is war, are Afghans fighting?

From Rahmullah Yusufzai

PESHAWAR: Are the Afghans really fighting in distant Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Tajikistan and Kashmir? This question has cropped up again in the wake of allegations by some Russian government leaders that Afghans were fighting alongside the rebellious Chechen Muslims.

Arabs fighting their conservative, pro-West governments in Algeria and Egypt also have some Afghan war veterans in their ranks, who are considered more radical and better trained. But they are Arabs and not Afghans even though they are referred to as Afghans for having fought in the Afghan Jihad.

"We probably have the largest force of battle-hardened men in the world. Jobless and with no hope of a

better future in war-ravaged Afghanistan, our young men are ready to fight yet another jihad even if it is in a distant Muslim land," said an Afghan leader, requesting anonymity.

The presence of Afghan mujahideen in Chechnya has become a bone of contention between President Rabbani's government and its numerous opponents. Engineer Yunis, a representative of former militia warlord Rasheed Dostum in Moscow, alleged a few days ago that Rabbani and his right-hand man Ahmad Shah Masood had sent Afghans to Grozny, capital of Chechnya, to fight against Russian troops and also against Chechens opposed to President Dzhokar Dudayev's government. He also accused Masood of destabilising Tajikistan by sending his Afghan fighters to fight for Tajik rebels. Yunis denied that the anti-Rabbani Supreme Coordination Council for Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan (SCCIRA), which groups together Rasheed Dostum's Junbush-i-Melli Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, Prof. Mojaddedi's Afghan National Liberation Front and the Shiite Hezb-i-Wahdat, was in any way involved in the Chechnya fighting.

Not long ago, Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami was accused of sending its men to Azerbaijan to take part in the fighting against Armenia. There were reports that Afghans had been flown from Jalalabad to Baku to join Azeris fighting to push back Armenians from Nagorno-Karabagh and other occupied Azerbaijani territories.

The presence of Afghans in the Bosnian frontlines has also been reported, though a conclusive proof of their involvement was never presented. The Indian government has also alleged that foreigners, including Afghans and Arabs, were fighting alongside Kashmiris against Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir.

There are indications that some Afghans have fought in Azerbaijan and occupied Kashmir but their presence in Bosnia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya hasn't been proved. Rival Afghan groups often blame each other for involvement in these and other crises in distant lands. But their criticism is motivated by political ri-

After a few years preaching in Fayoum, Mr. Abdel Rahman rose to further prominence again in the late 1980's when he became the spiritual leader of what were known as the Arab-Afghans, the estimated 10,000 men from various Middle East countries, financed and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, who fought on the side of the Afghan Mujahideen in their war against the Soviet Union.

Mr. Abdel Rahman traveled at least twice to Pakistan and Afghanistan to urge on the anti-Soviet Arab fighters. In Pakistan he is reported to have lived outside the border town of Peshawar, where most of the anti-Soviet guerrilla groups were based, staying at the home of Mohammed Islambouli, an Arab-Afghan who was the brother of the man who organized the army faction that actually carried out the Sadat assassination. According to Mr. Hasaballah, Mr. Abdel Rahman's lawyer, the cleric sent two of his own sons to fight in Afghanistan.

But even as he played an active role in the war in Afghanistan, Mr. Abdel Rahman was running into renewed trouble back in Fayoum. The Egyptian Government, alarmed at the rise of violence by Islamic fundamentalists, began to crack down, and Mr. Abdel Rahman was one of its targets. Fayoum has one of Egypt's largest Christian communities, and Mr. Omar Abdel Rahman, according to Egyptian biographers of the sheik, issued a fatwa — a religious order — to his followers that justified the killing of Christians.

IN HIS OWN WORDS

FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A FOLLOWER

"We have to be terrorists. . . . The Great Allah said, "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the enemies of Allah."

valry and aimed at maligning each other.

As Afghanistan's neighbour, Tajikistan is the easiest place for Afghans to infiltrate. And they have been doing so quite often, with Masood's men reportedly providing every support to the anti-communist Tajik alliance. Other Afghan groups are also involved, including some mujahideen commanders in border provinces like Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz acting on their own.

Some Afghans appear to have drifted to occupied Kashmir as members of small groups aligned to the Islamist Kashmiri freedom-fighters. The links between Kashmiris and Afghans are quite old and many Kashmiri freedom-fighters are reported to have received military training in Afghanistan.

The News (Pakistan)

12/17/94

The Director General of the IRCICA, Dr Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, said the result expected from the seminar on 'Creativity and Islamic Arts and Crafts' was that it would provide an opportunity for regional comparative overviews of the state of development of crafts. He also mentioned that this seminar would be followed by others, to be organised in a series in cooperation with the member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and any other institution willing to cooperate with us for this project. Future seminars will focus on specialised topics and/or particular categories of crafts, he added. In this regard, the forthcoming event is planned to be organised with the collaboration of the Ministry of Culture of the Arab Republic

of Egypt. It would be an international seminar on 'Crafts in Islamic Architecture' with special emphasis on Mashrabiyya and Coloured Stained Glass.

The Executive Director of the Lok Virsa, Uxi Mufti, said the success of the festival was due to massive participation of artisans from different Muslim countries and Central Asian Republics adding that the festival was a symbol of unity among the craft people of different cultures and regions.

He reiterated on behalf of the government of Pakistan that in future similar festivals would be held to provide an opportunity to artisans. Uxi Mufti said that artisans were the real people behind the festival which had made it a memorable event of our history.

THE NEWS

R'Plndi/Islamabad.

16 OCT 1994



Grosser Saray in Sheberghan

Ex-communists back Taliban against mujahideen

From Abdullah Jan

PESHAWAR: Liberal and nationalist Afghans are reported to have joined hands with religious students (Taliban) in Kandahar province and are helping them against the mujahideen commanders.

Sources in some Peshawar-based NGOs, who recently visited Kandahar city, told The News that Parchamis and Khalqis of Dr Najibullah's PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) are supporting the Taliban uprising in Kandahar. They said the ex-communists are masterminding the operations of Taliban against the unpopular Afghan commanders.

"Taliban are on the roads while the ex-communists are behind the scene."

It is pertinent to mention here that the second biggest city of Afghanistan, Kandahar, was the main support base for the former Afghan monarch, Zahir Shah.

Sources said that due to lack of organisation, Taliban are dependent on ex-communists and it is an open secret in Kandahar city that Taliban enjoy the blessings of Khalqi and Parchami commanders. Though unaware of their names, sources said the ex-communists supporting Taliban are

not prominent figures. "These communists are, however, known in Kandahar city for their past attachment with PDPA," the sources asserted.

It was further learnt that recently Taliban have started a crackdown against Afghan mujahideen in Kandahar city and are testing them. Commonly known as Topakyan (one carrying a gun) in Kandahar city, the mujahideen are being stopped everywhere in the town, disarmed and put behind bars.

The News further learnt that Taliban are in possession of seven jet aircraft and a big quantity of arms and ammunition. Taliban claim, the sources said, the jets and ammunition were seized from a far-flung area in Kandahar province. "They claim the mujahideen commanders had hidden the jets and dumped the arms and ammunition long ago."

Sources further said President Rabbani had sent a huge amount of money for Taliban to undertake their operations, but they (Taliban) refused to keep the bucks. This money, sources said, was sent through Mulla Naqibullah, former corps commander of Kandahar province. "Taliban felt it

an insult and got angry over the offer."

Sources, who met a number of people in Kandahar city, said the Taliban uprising is the result of immoral activities of a group of homosexual Afghan commanders. "People said they used to keep young boys with them," sources quoted the locals of Kandahar city as saying. Though their activities were unpopular, sources said, there was no one to speak a word against the powerful commanders.

In the middle of 1994, a teacher of religious school came from Balochistan to Spin Boldak town bordering Pakistan and started teaching at a madrasa.

The teacher came to know about the homosexuals' group and went back to Balochistan to seek help against this group in Kandahar province. The religious teacher took with him Taliban from the madrasas in Quetta and other parts of Balochistan and fought against the hated commanders.

The News (Pakistan)

12/18

Talibaan factor

The departure of several hundred Afghan talibaan studying in madrassahs in the NWFP for Afghanistan to reinforce their colleagues, who have reportedly captured some provinces, is most disquieting. It provides unnecessary substance to Kabul's charges of Pakistan's interference in its internal affairs, as the movement of the students places Peshawar in a questionable position. With the government still unable to prevent some of the mujahideen-turned warlords from misusing its territory, the appearance of the talibaan factor tends to make Pakistan once again the open house that it was earlier during the "jihad" days, for all kinds of dubious elements. The nation is still paying a heavy price for an act that made a shambles of our own internal security.

It cannot be expected that this new wave of trained and equipped religious students will be without residual damage to Pakistan. As it is, the use of the madrassahs in Pakistan as military academies to prepare foreign fighters adhering to some particular persuasion, is most regrettable, it will have an even worse effect in Pakistan. It is now quite likely that these institutions, which are meant to initiate students in the pristine teachings of Islam, will become centres for our myriad religious organisations to militarily prepare their cadres for purposes that will be far removed from religious obligations. The NWFP government could not have possibly been oblivious of what sort of training these madrassahs were imparting to the highly impressionable youth, not all of them Afghan. That no action was taken on this score is surprising, as the authorities do have an interest in such matters, providing some of them with zakat funds.

While the Frontier government must now tidy up the situation and ensure that the madrassahs serve the purpose these are meant for, the federal government should deal with the problem at the international level. The Afghans, whether refugees or leaders, must be made to realise that Pakistan's duty as a sympathiser of their cause, whatever it was, ended years ago. Its hospitality and territory cannot any more be misused with the same abandon as in the past. The Afghan organisations to which these talibaan belong should be asked to explain their role vis-à-vis the training of their militant activists on Pakistani soil.

Regardless of the religious instructions imparted, training of foreigners in the art of war on Pakistan's soil does involve more than an aberration of an educational institution's rules. It strikes against the authority of the state and unnecessarily drags it into the internal squabbles of a neighbouring country. Islamabad needs to explain this development as it comes at a time when every effort is being made to maintain good relations with Kabul. Despatching trained and armed soldiers from here to participate in their bloody civil war is not going to help us.

Taliban group gaining strength in Afghanistan

KABUL, Dec 12: (PPI): "Popularity of Taliban (religious students) is fastly growing throughout Afghanistan. Perhaps no one knew about this organisation till a month ago. But now its political strength is growing with such a speed that there is now every likelihood that they may join the peace initiative launched by the United Nations in Afghanistan," reports BBC.

The religious students have emerged successful in some very big actions during the last six weeks. They have either defeated or made ineffective big armies of various field commanders mostly belonging to big political parties of Afghanistan.

These students have now a big area of southern Afghanistan including several provincial capitals under their control. It is said that they are now busy getting control of the capital of Ghazni province. According to some reports they have also pledged to occupy Kabul.

Great interest is being expressed over their activities in foreign countries particularly at a time when the United Nations had stepped up its efforts for the establishment of peace in Afghanistan. The special envoy of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan, Mahmoud Mestiri is expected to have talks with the Afghan leaders later this month.

On this occasion his meeting is also expected with the representatives of students.

However, the United Nations and foreign governments have admitted that they have very little information about this group.

The students had first appeared at the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but later they went in the background. Some people say that they had gone to Pakistan to get religious education there. It appears from the way of life of most of these students that they have studied in Pakistan.

The students group is affiliated with a branch of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam which is headed by

taken part in the fighting in the guise of students. For the time being Western governments have adopted a wait and see policy but they have admitted that the victories which the students have scored recently have changed the political map of that country.

guards for this convoy. When local commanders attacked this convoy near Kandahar, they launched a counter-attack and defeated at least four Sardars.

Pakistan and the students group have rejected the reports that Pakistani militiamen had

Later Pakistan also sent a convoy to Central Asia via Afghanistan in October last year. It was the first Pakistani convoy of its nature to Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in 1979. The student discharges the duties of

Maulana Fazlur Rehman. These students guarded a Pakistani delegation to Minister. This delegation of Pakistan had come to Afghanistan to review the prospects of opening a trade route with Central Asian Republics via Afghanistan.

War Drags on in Eclipsed Afghanistan

No longer a superpower tussle; and overshadowed by other conflicts in the region, the Afghan war drags on unnoticed. Mushahid Hussain reports for Inter Press Service from Islamabad.

CIVIL war and ethnic bloodbath in Yemen and Rwanda eclipsed this month's flare-up in fighting in Afghanistan, robbing the carnage of international publicity that is so vital for relief and peace efforts.

International mediators, fatigued by fire-fighting conflicts in the neighbourhood, also seem to have nearly given up trying to arrange meaningful talks. Meanwhile, Afghanistan has split into territories controlled by warlords, and virtually ceased to exist as a country.

On June 25, a major ground offensive backed by aerial bombardment by forces of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and his defence minister Ahmed, Shah Masoud forced rivals loyal to ex-guerrilla chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to retreat from a hill from which they had been bombarding Kabul.

The fighting since then has been so fierce that it has been too dangerous to rescue the wounded. More than 3,000 people, mostly non-combatants, have died since the latest slaughter began in January.

The shelling and rocket-fire has laid Kabul in ruins, 500,000 people have fled the city to refugee camps in Jalalabad near the Pakistani border. Those who remain have been desperately trying to get out of the way of the latest fighting.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan in Jalalabad is woefully short of funds and cannot even take care of existing refugees. There have been feeble attempts to restart peace efforts.

The UN special envoy, former Tunisian foreign minister Mehmod Mestiri, was in Islamabad and Kabul this month. The chairman of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) Hamid al Ghabid was in Islamabad and managed to meet Rabbani in Kabul amidst a barrage of artillery fire.

But neither seems to have any new ideas, and there have predictably been little indications of progress. Afghan-watchers here feel the war has



taken on a dangerous ethno-ideological character and is being fanned by regional powers. There are also increasing signs of the conflict being tied up to the two-year-old civil war in neighbouring Tajikistan.

"It looks more and more certain that Afghan peace talks must encompass the Central Asian states, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia," says one senior Pakistani diplomat.

Perhaps mindful of the dangers of the merging of the Afghan and Tajik conflicts that Mestiri flew on to Tashkent, the Uzbek capital after his visit to Islamabad. Talks in Tehran last week between the Tajik government and rebels failed to reach a ceasefire agreement.

The latest fighting in Kabul erupted just as Rabbani was nearing the end of his 18-month term due to expire on June 28 as agreed in the Pakistan-brokered Islamabad Accord signed by Rabbani and Hekmatyar.

Recently, the supreme court in Kabul extended Rabbani's term by six months and stripped Hekmatyar of his prime ministerial position.

Rabbani and Masoud, who are both ethnic Tajiks, now have a stronger hand in Kabul and their offensive will bring some respite from

Hekmatyar's rockets, but fighting between rival alliances is flaring in other Afghan regions, including Herat and Kandahar.

Hekmatyar is allied with the formerly pro-Soviet Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostam, and it was Dostam's frontline troops who were badly mauled in last week's offensive.

Dostam is now regrouping in his stronghold of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. An ethnic Uzbek, he is believed to be receiving support from Uzbekistan, mainly in the form of spare parts for his Soviet-built helicopters and jets with which he has been bombarding government positions.

Unlike Rabbani, Masoud and Dostam, Hekmatyar is an ethnic Pashtoon from Afghanistan's south-eastern regions. A majority of the five million Afghans who fled the country during the Afghan-Soviet war were Pashtoons. Some have returned, but the exodus had given non-Pashtoons more prominence in Afghan affairs.

Underlying the ethnic and religious differences that have rent the Afghan fabric is a resurgent Pashtoon nationalism that could even bring Hekmatyar to side with former Soviet-backed leader Gen Najibullah who has been hiding in the United Nations compound in Kabul ever since he was toppled in 1992.

Afghan exports says Russian

and Central Asian mediation is crucial to a resolution of the Afghan war. As long as Moscow sees an Islamic threat in its 'near abroad' it will be engaged in propping the Tajik government and by extension be involved in Afghanistan.

Other regional powers, like Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia back their favourite factions within Afghanistan and their security concerns also need to be addressed.

Iran backs the Hizbe Wahdat, Uzbekistan backs Dostam, Saudi Arabia looks after the interests of the Ittehad-e-Islami after it fell out with Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami. And Rabbani accuses Pakistan of backing Hekmatyar.

Pakistan and Iran agree that Rabbani should have stepped down on Jun 28, but the Saudis wanted him to stay on since the Ittehad is allied with the president's group.

But Pakistan is not very popular in Kabul these days after it closed its border for refugees fleeing the latest fighting. Earlier this year, the Pakistani embassy in Kabul was ransacked and burnt.

Without a resolution of the Tajik and Afghan wars, Pakistan cannot benefit from being a transit point for Central Asia.

In Afghanistan itself, the hopes for immediate progress in peace talks look dim as the Hekmatyar-Dostam combine try to regain their strategic high ground around Kabul.

Dostum forms fake airline

A military aircraft, owned by Uzbek warlord, Rashid Dostum, has been bringing a large number of passengers from Mazar to Peshawar without valid travel documents for the last three months, The Frontier Post reported.

The Russian-made AN-32, a transport plane with a seating capacity of 21 passengers was allowed to land at Peshawar Airport with more than 60 passengers and large quantities of cargo.

The plane, painted in the color of Ariana Afghan Airline planes, was also used for taking official delegations to and from Mazar-i-Sharif. Personnel of the Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan have found that the plane was conducting passenger flights illegally and have seized fake Ariana airline's tickets from the passengers.

Ariana officials in Peshawar made it clear that the plane was not from Ariana's fleet.

The Pakistani's decision to allow a "passenger plane" of a rebel group to operate international routes is an obvious breach of rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and IATA, both of which Pakistan is a member.

Moreover, the Dostum plane was not in-

sured and is operated by military pilots who were not trained for international operations. Therefore, the flight of this plane to Pakistan not only poses a serious danger to Afghan and Pakistani nationals but also could have proved hazardous to legitimate airlines operating in the area.

The reason given by the Pakistanis that the plane was allowed on humanitarian grounds is not true. It was being allowed in order to favor General Dostum. Humanitarian flights do not carry passengers and cargo for commercial purposes. This plane also made weekly flights to Meshed, Iran, from Mazar.

This Dostum "passenger plane" was also used to ferry soldiers and military supplies between Mazar and Charasyab. This plane crashed in Logar at the end of September when it was bringing militiamen from Mazar to fight in Kabul. Its pilot, Khwaja, was seriously injured.

The Dostum "passenger plane" actually belonged to Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and was parked for a long time in Jalalabad airport. Haji Qadeer, the governor of Nangarhar, allowed the plane to be flown from Jalalabad to Mazar. Some people speculate that Qadeer was paid a large amount of money to allow the plane to be flown to Mazar.

Care provides drinking water for Khairkhana

The people in Khair Khana District of Kabul are provided with clean drinking water.

Around 1 million people suffered from a lack of clean drinking water for one year due to a power cut by Gulbuddin.

They drank water from shallow wells which caused a lot of diseases. The hard water from these wells was not proper for washing either. Poor people had to spend a lot of money on soap to properly wash their clothes.

The clean drinking water was brought back to this part of the city with the help of Care International, a foreign relief organization, which is also involved in other relief activities such as cleaning the city of garbage and helping the displaced people.

A government official said: "We are only able to pump 25% of the water we provided to the people before." In

view of increased population of Khairkhana due to the war situation, this water is not enough.

The ordinary people appreciate the work of Care International. At the same time they ask some tough questions of the government and the opposition:

They ask: "Why didn't the government take steps to revive the water supply system of Khairkhana? While a lot of money is spent in less important areas, the government could have provided fuel for generators to pump the clean water."

They ask Gulbuddin Hikmatyar: "Why do you cut our drinking water?" While a foreign relief organization is helping us, you who claim to be fighting to bring a pure Islamic system of government in the country continue to cut the power supply of the city and stop food and fuel from reaching the poor people of Kabul. Does not Islam teach mercy on people? Do not you find other means to fight your rivals other than cutting the power supply of the city and blocking its roads?"

Although Care's activity in Kabul is new, it has set a good example for hundreds of relief organizations based

Iran postpones refugee repatriation program

The Iranian Interior Minister has told an Afghan leader that the government of Iran will allow those Afghan refugees with temporary resident cards to remain in that country for 8 months more.

This decision was made in view of the arrival of winter, an Iran government official said.

Forcible expulsion of Afghan refugees by the authorities in Khurasan Province of Iran caused Ismail Khan, the governor of Herat, to visit Iran. He told Iranians that due to the arrival of winter and shortages of essential commodities and houses in Herat, expulsion of the Afghan refugees would have disastrous consequences.

In view of the hostile attitude of the governor of Khurasan towards the Afghan refugees, harassment against them by the security forces of Iran is expected to continue.

Recent floods have inflicted casualties and heavy material losses in Takhar, Badakhshan and Ghazni provinces, Bakhter Information Agency reported.

Floods destroyed 50 houses, two mosques and over 80 hectares of farmland in Takhar Province. The Takhar-Badakhshan road was closed due to floods.

In the neighboring Badakhshan Province, nine people were killed by floods. Around 2,072 families suffered material losses in 55 villages in Badakhshan.

Two people were killed by floods in Qarabagh District, Ghazni Province. More than 56 houses and three hundred and seventy underground irrigation canals (Kariz) were destroyed.

in Peshawar. If ICRC, AIM, MSF and Care can work in Kabul, other relief organization have no valid argument against being present in Kabul.

For Naseerullah Babar's consideration!

Dr SHER ZAMAN TAJZI

In a recent statement, federal interior minister Maj-Gen (Retd) Naseerullah Babar, said that the Afghan government should reciprocate the transit trade agreement by allowing Pakistani trade convoys to the Central Asia through its territory. He added that the 1965-transit trade agreement between the two countries, gave both the parties the right to transit their goods through the territory of each other.

The minister said that the agreement ought to work both ways as Pakistan by allowing landlocked Afghanistan to import and export goods through its territory was justified in expecting that its goods would be allowed transit to the Central Asian states through Afghanistan. He believed that the tripartite agreement between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan in 1992 also allowed transit facilities through Afghanistan for Pakistani and Turkmen goods.

The strange aspect of the statement, which is a follow-up of the recent happenings in the south-western parts of Afghanistan, is that the statement comes from the interior minister, who has been moving about in the quagmire without realising that it is not, at all, his jurisdiction. He is the interior minister and ought to tend to the swelling tension within the country rather than worrying about the foreign affairs and intervention in the affairs of a neighbouring state.

Certain Afghan leaders and intellectuals have been complaining about the interference of Pakistan. Deen Muhammad Hukman, a deputy minister of the Afghan government, was reported by the press in Pakistan on June 30 that he had given an interview to a newspaper of Saudi Arabia in that country when he was on a visit at the head of the official Haj delegation. He had mentioned ISI as intervening in the affairs of Afghanistan. The interview was refuted by a number of unnamed observers with minor variations.

In September, the interior minister of Pakistan, Maj-Gen (Retd) Naseerullah Babar, entered Afghanistan at the head of a delegation. He was accorded a rousing reception at Kandahar. The crowd chanted slogans of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the Governor of Kandahar. Commander Gul Agha received the delegation. On way to Herat, the governor of Hilmand hosted a reception in their honour.

The interior minister inaugurated the Pakistan consulate at

Herat. On that occasion, he said that Pakistan wished to start its trade with the Central Asian countries. That function had been attended by the governor of Herat Muhammad Ismail, chairman of National Highway Authority, Maj-Gen (Retd) Hedayatullah Khan and Pakistan ambassador Amir Usman.

Governor Ismail, in his speech, said that the movement of awakening among the Asian Muslims had been launched during the tenure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He hoped that Benazir Bhutto would take solid steps for the unity of the Asian countries. He also referred to reconstruction of roads in Afghanistan with the support of NHA and said that it would go a long way to end the civil war and promote a conducive atmosphere in Afghanistan.

Naseerullah Babar then said that the communication ministry would undertake a plan for road-building as well as to link the two countries by rail.

At Torghundah, Babar addressed a reception arranged in his honour by the governor of Torghundah. (It may be noted that Torghundah is small village on the Afghan-Turkmenistan border.) There he said that the trade convoys between Pakistan and Afghanistan would start operation by the end of October on experimental basis, for economic collaboration, mainly contributing to the rehabilitation of the ruined economy in Afghanistan.

The governor said that the voice of the unity of the Asian countries was first raised by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He also hoped that Benazir Bhutto would try to restore the long-standing relations with Afghanistan.

On return, Babar said that he had received the assurance that the convoys would be given full protection all along the route of their journey by the authorities concerned and the provincial governments. The convoys would operate on Karachi-Chaman-Kandahar-Herat route. After successful experiment, the convoys would carry on their business on permanent basis.

After what Babar considered the successful visit, a convoy of 30 trucks loaded with food items, medicine and other consumer goods was dispatched on the first week of November, on the given route. It was a gift from Pakistan to ease the goodwill of the people of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The convoy was commanded by a colonel of the

Comment

secret services of Pakistan. That convoy was stopped at Taghar Qala, 15 kilometres from Kandahar, held by the Afghanistan mujahideen groups which were still engaged in mutual hostility, and the food was looted there and then.

All of a sudden a group of 'Taliban' (students of religious schools) appeared on the scene and overran the commanders who had been standing again the supreme power of the former Soviet Union for about 14 years. Within a week, the commanders faced a defeat and fled away for safety. Hundreds of fighters died and many more were injured. On the second day of the fighting the 'Taliban' claimed to have killed 40 from the other side, whereas the observers estimated the death toll at 20 in a battle at Takhtapul, Kandahar.

The commanders involved in the initial fighting were named Mansoor, Ustad Alim and Arzai. A commander of Rabbani, Mullah Naqibullah, declared support to the 'Taliban' and Haji Sarkatib of Hizbi Islami (Hikmatyar) extended support to Aalm. In a later battle at Sprapuz, Haji Sarkatib was defeated. He also received injuries. The 'Taliban' captured the base with 25 tanks, some helicopters and large quantity of weapons and ammunition. Governor Gul Agha also lost Kandahar.

The 'Taliban', after having released the convoy with the crews and captured Kandahar without much resistance, advanced on Hilmand, the thriving opium production area, ruled by a major drug baron Akhunnazda Ghaffar. Their next target was Zabul.

The sudden appearance of about 2000 'Taliban', well armed and funded, on the scene with brand new Klashnikov assault rifles and their so rapid action like well trained guerrilla fighters gave rise to rumours that the whole operation had been planned and executed by the Frontier Corps. The Foreign Office and the Frontier Corps issued statements to refute those allegations. But how much one could believe of the rebuttal. Would those statements convince the Afghans and other powers that the two thousands religious students had gathered suddenly on their own, got the arms at their own expenses and charged the enemy in such a skillful discipline without a scheme and a commander?

This whole scenario blinks out many questions. First of all, one may think of the role of the interior minister of Pakistan, Maj-Gen (Retd) Naseerullah Babar. Did he consider Afghanistan the sixth province of Pakistan that he entered it and assured the hosts of reconstruction of roads and opening of utility stores etc there. He inaugurated the Pakistan consulate at Herat also. His visit and commitments indicate that the government of Benazir Bhutto still does not confide in foreign affairs minister Sardar Asaf Ahmad Ali, who had defected Nawaz Sharif during the last days of his government. Besides the foreign minister, what are the commerce and communication ministers for? Are they also just show pieces in the large cabinet of Benazir Bhutto? If the government have no confidence in the ministers, then how could it run the complex system.

Naseerullah Babar has utterly failed as the interior minister, but he is still holding on to the chair. The present law and order situation in Karachi and Malakand agency and the increasing violence throughout the country could not be covered by the harassment of the opposition members and the most costly propaganda unleashed through the media.

The sudden emergence of the 'Taliban' is another mystery which will keep up curiosity of the interesting parties for quite some time. But has the government of Pakistan ever thought that where all this will end up? She should know that, whatever she may think, there is no government in Afghanistan. In fact, there prevails a state of anarchy. Every village and town is ruled by a self made governor. Who these governors are? Sarkatibs (head clerks) and mullais (primary teachers) who could not stand an attack of the 'Taliban'. The interior minister, Maj-Gen (Retd) Naseerullah Babar, goes and talks to them and then tries to convince the Pakistanis that his visit was successful.

The situation in Afghanistan should not be taken so lightly. It needs serious and honest approach. Afghanistan needs peace. The fire raging in Afghanistan is now warming the enthusiasts spectators but it is spreading each and every moment. Pakistan is right on its way. It should, therefore, think more to extinguish the fire inside Afghanistan, and let the people hear a sigh of relief. Then it should think of the transit agreement of 1965 and convince the Afghans that grant of transit facility to Pakistan through Afghanistan would be beneficial to both.

From the Editor:

As we enter our 23rd year of publication, it occurs to us that the FORUM may be older than some of its readers. Since the elderly tend to repeat themselves, we'll launch into our annual disclaimer:

We publish as much information about Afghanistan as comes to our attention. We do not vouch for its veracity; one person's fact is another's propaganda. However, we always cite our sources (with the exception of the occasional rumor), & we recommend that you consider the source when reading the article. We take no political stand; we receive no funding (& no salaries); subscriptions are our only source of revenue. This is a voluntary effort & we depend on our readers to send us information - notices of events, news items, clippings, etc. We spell proper names the way they appear in the article cited. We hope that's everything. The elderly tend to forget, too!

Now, what's happening to the FORUM? True, the editor is leaving Manhattan; however, the FORUM address will remain the same, at least for 1995.

Because of postal increases, rising reproduction costs, as well as the scarcity of constructive news about Afghanistan, the FORUM will be issued quarterly - January, April, July & October. The subscription rate will remain the same. And, should peace break out we'll issue an extra!

By the time the next issue is due out, we hope to have entered the computer age and maybe even have a fax machine. How long it will take us to get this all operating efficiently something else. The elderly are slow.


Considering all that, we hope you will want to renew your subscriptions; most of them expire with this issue. We depend on your interest & support. We only hope you enjoy reading the FORUM as much as we enjoy preparing it.

If a renewal notice is enclosed with this issue, you owe us money in order to keep your FORUMS coming.

Our continuing thanks to those of you who send us information, please keep it up. The deadline for the next issue is April 1, no fooling!

This year's Occasional Paper (#34, since we're wallowing in longevity) will be "The Frontier 'Tribal' Areas - 1840-1990" by Robert Nichols. We hope to have it in time to include with the April issue but it depends on how facile we are with the computer.

The drawings with German captions are from ERINNERUNGEN AN AFGHANISTAN 1940-1946, see Recent Publications, p. 25.



Chaikhana, Teehaus an der Strasse von Kabul nach Afghanisch-Turkestan

رمضان - شوال ١٤١٥
February - March 1995

خوت ١٣٧٣

جمعه Friday	پنج شنبه Thursday	چهار شنبه Wednesday	سه شنبه Tuesday	دو شنبه Monday	يك شنبه Sunday	شنبه Saturday
24 ٥ ٢٤	23 ٤ ١٢	22 ٣ ٢٢	21 President's Day ٢١	20 ١ ٢٠		
3 ١٢ ٢ عبد فطير	2 ١١ ١ شوال ٢ عبد فطير	1 March ١٠	28 ٩ ٢٨	27 ٨ ٢٧	26 ٧ ٢٦	25 ٦ ٢٥
10 ١٩ ٩	9 ١٨ ٨	8 St. Patrick's Day ٧	7 ١٦ ٦	6 ١٥ ٥	5 ١٤ ٤	4 ١٣ ٣ عبد فطير
17 ٢٦ ١٦	16 ٢٥ ١٥	15 ٢٤ ١٤	14 ٢٣ ١٣	13 ٢٢ ١٢	12 ٢١ ١١	11 ٢٠ ١٠
Happy	New	Year		20 ٢٩ ١٩	19 ٢٨ ١٨	18 ٢٧ ١٧

OPINION

To the Editor:

After fourteen years struggle the communist regime collapsed in Afghanistan and the Islamic Freedom fighter or so called Majahedeen Leaders by the help of Pakistanis government grabbed the power in Kabul and proclaimed a phony Islamic state of Afghanistan people all over the country were jubilant and celebrating as the puppet "communist" regime was over but another evil regime took over. The newly established Islamic state of Afghanistan leaders, started fighting each other in Kabul, just for the sake of grabbing the power. Since April 28, 1992 they fired thousands upon thousands rockets, artillery shells and bombed the city and killed thousands upon thousands innocent Kabul residents, plundered the houses; offices; institutions; banks; shops and other people belongings, of course the communist elements and certain foreign powers had their hand in the delivery.

Almost a million of Kabul residents fled the city and went to the east and north of Kabul to save their lives. This phony and evil regime put women back under veils and banded them from working in the offices and other institutions. Schools and universities are closed, the Kabul city has been destroyed completely. The richest museum in the in Asia and the world with all its unique treasures were stolen or taken to Pakistan or Iran, to rebuild the city they need millions of dollars. Malnutrition and disease has killed 30,000 children, pregnant women delivered their babies on the road-side or in the mosque. There is no doctors, midwives, nurses and medicine, no electricity; no water; no food and Kabul besiege by the War Lord. Food prices and other essential things have sky rocketed, no one can afford to buy a loaf of bread. Practically every educated man and women left the city. There is no central authority guns, rockets became the king or the president. This is a "holocaustic" situation, Hooligans are in the city in great numbers. Pakistan's leaders and ISI are the main cause of this misery as well as the Iranians Mullahs. Peace initiatives taken by the UN or Islamic or non-align countries, the Pakistans and Iranians creating obstacles and problem to prevent the settlement. Uncertainty prevails and Pakistan, Iran, Arabia, Russia and Uzbekistan are the main obstacles to peace in our country. In this icy winter there is nothing, no shelter; no fuel; no medicine; we fear thousands of children, women, sick people and elderly will die of the war and harsh winter.

The future of our country in the hand of "fundamentalist" and the Pakistans, ISI, its looks very gloomy. The minister of interior of Pakistan are moving around in our country, like his own house without any legal justification. He took western countries, and ambassadors with him, without visa or permission from the nominal central government to facilitate the way for the future Paskistanies Caravan to central Asisian countries.

Its obvious that violation of the UN charter and international law and diplomatic procedure and human rights. The present ambassador Rawan Ferhadi, do not represent Afghanistan people and the UN,

should call upon him as a persona-nagrata and expel him from the UN. Also put pressure on Pakistan and Iran and Russia to stop interfering in our internal affair, and leave us alone, enough is enough, do not aggravate the present misery of our people. We support the UN initiatives peaceful settlement and Mr. Mestiri mission in the Afghan conflict. Free election and broad base government is the only solution, once again we Afghans earnestly requesting the General Secretary of the UN to act upon and bring about a peaceful settlement in our war torn country.

Abdullahi
Kabuli
12.29.94

Kandahar city falls to Afghan students

From AMANULLAH

QUETTA — Afghanistan's capital of southern province of Kandahar fell to the religious students (Afghan talibs) on Friday, late night, when they overpowered the Afghan commanders Manzoor, amir Lalia and Ustad Slim after heavy fighting which had continued for three days, claiming more than 15 lives and injuring 28 people from both sides.

The religious student's spokesman Maula Hanif, while talking to *The Frontier Post* on telephone from Chaman town on Saturday evening rejected the allegations of defeated Afghan commanders that their victory of Kandahar city was due to the support of Frontier Corps (FC) and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and added that Afghan talibs when did not accept the domination of former Soviet Union how

they would take help from the ISI.

According to reports the Afghan talibs have rescued the caravan of 30 trucks including Colonel Imam of ISI and PTV team when they captured the Taghar Kala area where the trucks were stranded by the supporters, loyal to Mansoor, Amir Lalia and Usand Alim.

These reports added that 50 per cent of goods of trucks were looted by the armed men of commanders but Maula Hanif told this correspondent that all the material in the trucks was safe as their armed men foil the attempt of the commanders to loot the gifts sent by the prime minister, Benazir Bhutto for the Afghan provinces and central Asian states which include medicine, food stuffs and surgical instruments.

Maula Hanif said the trucks would soon leave for destination and they would take all steps to

pass these from the Afghan areas into the Central Asian states.

Sources said tribal elders of the Kandahar would not tolerate the success of religious students and it was possible that these elders might convene their meeting in three or four days to take joint future line of action against the Afghan talibs.

These sources said that if the fighting between talibs and tribal commanders expanded then relations between Pakistan and tribal elders would be badly damaged as these tribal elders were against any direct control of Kandahar province by the Pakistani authorities.


The Pakistani trucks according to the reports said that it were still detained till Friday afternoon and the traffic between the Kandahar city and Chaman border town remained suspended for the second consecutive day.

Frontier Post 11/6/94

Wali Ahmad Raoufi presented a rebab concert at Washington Square Church in New York City on 1/13. He was accompanied on the tabla by Broto Roy. The World Music Institute sponsored the concert.



Belalter und geschmückter afghanischer Lastwagen, Lorry





PEOPLE

The Making of a Hero

*The story of
Zaid Haidary*

Heroes are much on our minds these days. Many people say we no longer have adequate heroes. Role models—from major sports figures to politicians to religious leaders—are betraying our trust. Where do we look for leadership and heroism?

Perhaps one aspect of our changing world is that our heroes, too, are changing form. They are no longer out there on the horizon larger than life, only accessible through myth and the mass media. They are not “out there” like the rich and famous. They are right here amongst us.

I know one myself. He is an ordinary person. But he turned insight into action. He made some important choices. He listened to his heart. And he is making a difference.

His name is Zaid Haidary, and he is from Afghanistan. We happened to meet during our Beyond War days. Here is his story.

Zaid is an Afghan Pushtun, one of the powerful traditional tribes or clans of Afghanistan. He grew up in Afghanistan and graduated with a degree in law. But his mental horizons extended beyond his own country, and he wanted to know more than he could learn in Afghanistan. Zaid desired further education, and he wanted to see the world. His journey had begun.

In the '70s, Zaid came to the United States, leaving home with \$600 in his pocket and without even saying good-bye to his family. He had made his decision independently, and he wrote his father that he would be going to America to study and that he would be all right. Zaid came to the United States because he could work and support himself as he pursued his studies.

He survived by holding down several dishwashing jobs. “School cost \$3200 per semester, and making enough money by washing dishes was not an easy thing to do,” Zaid recalled. “There was a Mediterranean coffee shop on Telegraph Avenue, and all they served was chocolate cake and carrot cake. I would have eaten enough cake by one o'clock at night to last me til four o'clock the next day.” But Zaid persisted and was awarded his Masters Degree in Political Science.

These years saw the Soviet Union invade and occupy Afghanistan. The Afghans, a proud and fierce people, responded by raising a “jihad,” a holy war against the infidel Communists, eventually causing the Soviets to withdraw, and, the Afghans claim, the eventual downfall of Communism.

Afghanistan, however, was left desolate. Tribes and clans, which had been abundantly supplied with weapons and the wherewithal to fight a war, had found a new source of power but had seen their land and traditional ways of life laid to waste. Tribes fell to fighting tribes, and internecine warfare erupted and swept

Afghanistan. The Kalashnikov, the automatic rifle used by the Soviets and also supplied to the Afghan resistance by the United States' CIA, had come to rule Afghanistan, and it was difficult now to shift the foundation of power. Afghanistan had become, and remains today, a nation torn apart by violence and a lust for power.

When a group of Afghan refugees approached Beyond War for counsel about what to do to help move Afghanistan beyond war, Zaid was among them. He and his wife went to an Afghan refugee camp near the city of Peshawar. In retrospect, Zaid admits, it was a naive effort: he and his wife were bloodied and battered by the mobs of people trying to get at the food they had brought to distribute.

He decided to take on the challenge in a more systematic and organized way.

He began in his home in Peshawar, with one employee, seeking to work on projects that would help his country recover from the devastation of war. Today, Zaid's organization, the Reconstruction Development Association (RDA), provides direct help to thousands of Afghans within Afghanistan and additional thousands in refugee camps in Pakistan. There are RDA offices in Islamabad, Quetta, Peshawar, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Paktya, and Mazar-e-Sharif (the area in which Zoroaster once lived and taught). Two hundred people, including 30 construction engineers, work full time for RDA, and an average of 500 others at any one time are on RDA's payroll for different projects.

The RDA helped build and now oversees a refugee camp for 132,000 Afghans—a camp the size of a city, with streets, schools, markets, kitchens, mosques, latrines, and tents for the people to live in. The RDA helps rebuild roads, irrigation systems, and schools in Afghanistan. It helps educate Afghans about effective agricultural techniques. It provides emergency relief that Zaid says not many other organizations are willing to, or could do, such as supplying food during the wintertime to Kabul, Afghanistan's capital city. "And not small amounts,"

Zaid says proudly, "but 5000 to 6000 metric tons of food per month. And we haven't lost a single truck."

Zaid thinks that the success of the RDA is helped by an even-handed approach. Though he is a Pushtun, he works equally well with other tribes like the Hazaras and Tajiks, Panjshiri and Uzbeks, and with the forces headed by Rabbani and Hekmatyar, Masoud, Sayaf, Khalis, and was working as a consultant to the governor of California at the time. He now owned several apartments and a grocery store and was doing well. He had a family. His life was good. But Zaid was not sleeping well at night, thinking about his homeland. He was troubled. Afghanistan was in a miserable condition, and he wanted to do something.

A team of Afghans and members of Beyond War, who had earlier traveled to Pakistan to meet Afghan leaders, developed a plan based upon Afghan tradition for bringing Afghans together to talk. Visits were made to Washington, D.C.—to talk to the State Department, to Congress, to the White House, and to the international community to promote the plan—and then to New York to speak with experts at the United Nations. Zaid, using personal resources, participated in these efforts, and a new world opened up to him. He found these people—some of the most powerful in the world—accessible, real, with feelings and frustrations of their own. He claims that his work today in Afghanistan stems from those initial experiences with the Beyond War Afghan team.

Zaid's decision: go back himself to his homeland to see how he could help. He began by basing his operations in Pakistan, the center of the refugee Afghan government and most of the Afghan relief efforts. His first thought was to bring food to those who had fled from the Soviet invasion, so he

Richard Rathbun

TIMELINE.

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Dostum. "In the last four years, we have established such good relationships with the commanders in all the political parties that whatever we tell them or promise them, we deliver. We are honest with them; we never give them false hopes. And also at the same time, it is very clear that we're not taking sides with anybody; we're not a political organization. We're just there to help."

Another key to the success of RDA is Zaid's approach to the rival commanders. "Even though he may be illiterate and has no education, I treat each commander with the same respect I would show to a Ph.D. engineer. It's important not to take his pride from him. Take each one as he is, respect him as an Afghan, as a human being. Sit and chit-chat with him. If he brings tea, drink the tea with him."

When asked how he works so well with diverse ethnic and religious groups who so often hate each other, Zaid harkens back to his youth and the influence of his father. "I lived with Uzbek and Turkman for three years and loved it. Of my two best friends, one was from Laghman, which was mixed Pushtun and Hazara, and the other was Hindu. The people running my father's business were Turkman, so I could see they are lovely people. Another thing helping me is the background of my family. My father and my uncles worked around the country as governors, congressmen, police officers, the military. Throughout the history of Afghanistan, they have not damaged the name of the family; they always served. So the name of Haidary has helped me all along. People trust the name, and as a family member you cannot do anything wrong because always you have to save the name of the family."

Zaid has a dream. His dream is a peaceful Afghanistan. He dreams of being able to travel through Afghanistan without having to cross from the jurisdiction of one faction or one commander to another as if he were traveling from sovereign nation to sovereign nation. He feels that

his work helps to wean Afghans away from force and violence as the basis for power and identity, and toward agriculture, building infrastructure, education, and free enterprise. He says his work is to give his people "a taste of ice cream." Once they have tasted the sweetness of a life with meaning beyond the Kalashnikov, Zaid says, they begin to see that they have been asleep. They begin to question the fighting, the dying, and the rule of the gun. They begin to ask if there is not a better way to live.

Zaid dropped by during a brief visit to the United States recently. He works hard, he says—eighteen hours a day, seven days a week. He faces enormous challenges, which he enjoys, and danger, which he accepts. Zaid is not sure that his work will bring peace to Afghanistan, but he feels good about what he is doing, adding, "Now when I go to sleep, I sleep like a baby."

While Zaid traces his work today to his experiences with Beyond War, there always was in this solid, unassuming man the intelligence, the imagination, the initiative, the sense of humor, the dedication, the love. It awaited just a spark.

One of the most prestigious Afghan commanders in the war with the Soviets is known by his people as the Lion of Panjshir. Zaid Haidary in his way is a new type of Lion, the kind Afghanistan and the world sorely needs.



RDA engineers reviewing plans for a construction project in Afghanistan.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

The December issue of the ACBAR Resource & Information Centre Bulletin lists the following recent publications:

ANTIQUÉ MONUMENTS OF BAMYAN IN HAZARAJAT [Farsi], A. Godard & J. Hackin, translated from the original French by Ahmad Ali Khan, Ismailian Publications, Qum, 1993. 173 pp + photos.

"Italie- Afghanistan 1921-1941" by May Schinasi in ANNALI, Istituto Universitario Orientale, v. 53, fasc. 2, Naples, 1993. 48 pp with photos.

SENTIMENTS OF THE PASHTUN TRIBES, biographies of renowned Pashtun [Pashtu], Shirin Khan Nasir, Kauser Books, Quetta, 1993. 372 pp.

VIOLETS [Dari], Khalilullah Raufi, Gov't Printing House, Kabul, 1990. 84 pp.

HORSE RIDING & WRESTLING IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN HAVE A LONG RECORD [Dari], Sultan Moh'd Ansari, Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, Balkh, 1992. 28 pp. with photos.

ETHNOGRAPHY OF SISTAN [Dari]. Moh'd Azam Sistani, Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan, Kabul, 1990. 260 pp.

A CATALOG OF THE LOUIS & NANCY H. DUPREE COLLECTION: AFGHANISTAN, ANTHROPOLOGY, ARCHAEOLOGY, ISLAMIC CENTRAL ASIA, ETHNOLOGY, MILITARY HISTORY, SOUTH ASIA & RELATED SUBJECTS, compiled & edited by Avinash C. Maheshwary, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, 1994. 362 pp, photos.

A DECADE OF DEMOCRACY IN AFGHANISTAN [Dari], Sahi, WUFA, Peshawar. 57 pp.

The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan has issued 3 more volumes of THE AGRICULTURAL SURVEY OF AFGHANISTAN:

"Repatriation & Rehabilitation of Afghan Refugees," National Summary, 16th Report, part IV, November 1993;

"Agriculture Survey of Afghanistan 1992-1993," 17th Report, December 1993;


"Reference Manual, Agricultural Surveys," 18th Report, July 1994.

ERINNERUNGEN AN AFGHANISTAN 1940 - 1946, the journals of Swiss architect Rudolf Stuckert, published by BIBLIOTHECA AFGHANICA, edited by Paul Bucherer-Dietschi, [German] Liestal, 1994. 226 pp., paper. Even if you can't read German, the drawings in this volume, 11th in the Bibliotheca Afghanica series, make it a wonderful addition to any library on Afghanistan. Order from Bibliotheca Afghanica, Benzburweg 5, CH 4410 Liestal, Switzerland. 240 pp. 35 Swiss francs plus postage. All the drawings in this issue with German captions are from this publication.

ROSTAM DE L'HINDOU KOUCH by Dominique & Hubert Paugam, L'ecole des loisirs, France. A book of photographs with commentary by 2 people who served with Medecins sans Frontieres in Badakhshan in 1989. Ff. 76.

CEREDAF, 12 rue de Cotte, 75012 Paris, has two new offerings: SPETSNAZ EN AFGHANISTAN by Alexei V. Tchikchev, translated from the Russian (into French) by Philippe Frison. 100 pp. + photos. 67 Ff + postage; & AFGHANISTAN: MUSIQUE POPULAIRES, a cassette of 12 popular songs & chants recorded by Bernard Dupaigne in Afghanistan in 1967 & 1973. 75 Ff + postage.

THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF ISLAM, 1250 - 1800. by Sheila S. Blair & Jonathan Bloom, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994. 348 pp., illus. \$65. (See NYT review beginning on p. 27.)



Mausoleum von Sultan Abdul Razaq

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: FRAGMENTS OF EMPIRE, MAGNETS OF WEALTH by Charles Undeland and Nicholas Platt, The Asia Society, New York, 1994. xiii + 143 pp. Figures, maps, tables, bibliography. Paperback.

The Asia Society, in publishing THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: FRAGMENTS OF EMPIRE, MAGNETS OF WEALTH, offers a handbook to encourage travelers, inform potential investors and start in reclaiming from its Soviet isolation a historic part of what orientalist call Inner Asia. This smartly-styled paperback authored by Nicholas Platt, president of The Asia Society, and Charles Undeland, a recent graduate of Brown University, surveys in lively non-academic language the post-Soviet status and future prospects for the five successor Muslim republics, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Nicholas Platt brings to the study the perspective of broad diplomatic experience in the Far East, and most recently service as US Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This is a unique advantage for understanding the oriental character of Central Asia and its affinity with other Muslim areas, an aspect often misunderstood when viewed chiefly through a Russian prism. Charles Undeland's journalistic experience and Russian fluency are apparent in the shrewd insights and non-official explanations of recent events gleaned from inquisitive reporters who have roamed the area.

There is an urgent need for just such an up-to-date brief but comprehensive survey of this little-known but now topical region. The introduction outlines recent political & economic developments, emphasizing that along with cultural similarities there are important differences among the five countries. Ethnic and linguistic variation, historic quarrels, haphazard Soviet boundaries, competition for water power and transportation - all have the potential for conflict that may override the new states' need for economic and political cooperation.

The opening chapter discusses Russian goals and policies in Central Asia. Short and well organized, it points out the contradiction between Russia's aim of retaining Central Asia in "its political embrace and as a source of raw materials while keeping the poorer regions at arm's length economically," a policy dubbed by some Russians as a sort of "Monroe's Doctrine" (p. 20). The aim of the Central Asian Republics, in contrast, is to achieve maximum economic cooperation while retaining political independence. For the present, and until new economic ties can be developed, Central Asian affairs will be dominated by chaotic Russian policy, a troubling prospect, indeed.

A separate chapter is devoted to each of the republics sketching their politics, economics and foreign relations. The authors personally visited four of the five countries in January 1994. Different natural resources & geographic location will determine the chances of each republic to kick free of Russian economic dependency. The legacy of Soviet-built industry, as the authors point out, is a mixed blessing. Such old plants "are invariably polluters and often produce something less valuable than the component raw materials" (p. 33). The hopeful trend is the growing number of joint ventures with partners outside the CIS. In addition to international consortiums negotiating for natural gas and oil development with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the most active investors are China, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran and the US, primarily in small manufacturing and trade enterprises.

The strongest portion of the book is the discerning analysis of foreign influence in Central Asia. Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and China have so far led the race for predominance in the newly independent Muslim states. Each of these contestants has certain advantages and drawbacks in the rush for trade and influence. A concluding chapter offers a cautious prognoses for the future.

United States policy has been less successful than that of some of the other countries competing for influence in Central Asia. Although American interests have secured important oil and natural gas agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, gold mining in Uzbekistan, and a non-nuclear agreement with Kazakhstan, the moralizing preachy approach adopted by US representatives toward governments viewed as undemocratic has alienated Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, two of the wealthiest and most important Central Asian countries. An overblown fear of the growth of anti-Western, anti-democratic "Islamic fundamentalism" has been another unfortunate influence on US policy. As Westerners learn more about Central Asia's civilization, reflected in its literature and history, there may be more tolerance for other models of government in countries with an Eastern tradition. Predating Western democracy or Marxist/Leninist socialism, Central Asia for millenia has considered the "Just Prince" as the ideal ruler and the most likely source of justice and general prosperity.

Central Asian specialists are often asked to recommend an introductory book on the area. Teachers, for example, who until recently have worked in the Soviet field mainly in Russian studies, now need quickly to learn about Central Asia. With this in mind, one could wish that the bibliography included a few books by Western scholars who work more with local languages. In Uzbek, for example, one could suggest the inclusion of a recent work by Edward Allworth, or James Crichtlow, or William Fierman, to name but a few. These would provide a valuable balance to the prevailing Russian view of Central Asia, and a take-off point for further reading. This, however, may go beyond the intended scope of this useful informative volume, which, by the way, would fit neatly into one's carry-on luggage.

Susanna Nettleton
Columbia University

THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF ISLAM, 1250-1800

By Sheila S. Blair
and Jonathan M. Bloom.
Illustrated. 348 pp. New Haven:
Yale University Press. \$65.

By Robert Hillenbrand

FIRST things first. This is a profoundly impressive book, for in addition to displaying a high degree of competence in what might be termed the nuts and bolts of writing a survey, its authors possess a sixth sense for identifying the key trends in the art history of a given area or period, and a blessed ability to look afresh at hackneyed material. The result is a book that is an outright pleasure to use, that reads smoothly, that has an apparatus that works without a hitch — and that constantly brings you up short with challenging insights. It is bursting with new ideas; these are not paraded with fanfare but slipped in unobtrusively in the midst of a description, a discussion about dating or an analysis of economic trends.

Although it stands to reason that such a book will deservedly attract many buyers because of its sheer beauty (design, drawings, and above all abundant color plates), it can also be recommended enthusiastically to students in search of a reliable summary of a given topic — for instance, pre-Mogul architecture in India — complete with suggestions for further reading, and perhaps above all to discriminating members of the general public with a nonspecialist interest in the Is-

lamic world. Expatriates living in that world, and tourists of all kinds, can be assured that this is the long-awaited guide to the art and architecture of the region from Spain to India as it developed from 1250 to 1800.

Yet there is also plenty here to repay careful reading by the specialist. This is emphatically not a laborious rehash of earlier handbooks, but a bold attempt to rewrite the history of later Islamic art virtually from scratch. How has this been done? Basically, the whole *modus operandi* has changed. In the past, general surveys of Islamic art have focused on the broad picture, moving from one big dynasty to another and in so doing ruthlessly simplifying the complexities of Islamic art. The overexposure of a few familiar masterpieces, and the suppression of certain decorative arts or of the output of minor dynasties, have been typical casualties of this approach. For this book, however, the authors have clearly set themselves to study the entire output of all but the geographically peripheral Muslim lands (such as Indonesia and both West and East Africa). After an introduction, 19 chapters deal with this material, and they encompass the lows as well as the highs, provincial as well as metropolitan output, the minor decorative arts as well as the major ones, work made for the market as well as work made for exalted patrons. The result is, at long last, a nuanced

Each chapter is introduced by a solidly constructed historical overview — political, religious, economic — specially designed to shed light on the visual arts; such sections are models of how this should be done. There follows a judicious blend of pithy generalization, inter-

continued on p. 33

Afghanistan: "War without Winners"

Review article

Mushahid Hussain

Perhaps no other event symbolically sums up the current reality of Afghanistan and Pakistan's relations with its strife-torn neighbour than Friday's meeting in the capital of Turkmenistan between the Pakistani Prime Minister and two prominent Afghan military chieftains, namely, General Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan. This meeting is an indicator of the fact that in order to pursue its objectives in Afghanistan, Pakistan has to directly negotiate not with the President or the Prime Minister of Afghanistan whose sway over that country is, in any case, limited to the capital and some other areas, but with leaders who control strategically placed cities like Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Herat in the south-west of Afghanistan and who are, therefore, crucial to Pakistan's planned access by land to Central Asian States. And with Pakistan having had the humiliation of its Embassy in Kabul being ransacked and closed, probably Ashkabad was a safer venue for parleys concerning Pakistan-Afghanistan and Pakistan-Central Asian relations.

Earlier, the Interior Minister flew with him a plane load of Western Ambassadors including the American Ambassador, to Herat with a view to eliciting Western empathy for continued humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan, a far cry from the days when the United States and its allies were pumping in millions of dollars both to shore up Pakistani support for the Mujahideen and for the upkeep of the biggest refugees population in the world then, the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Amidst a fast-changing world which has almost totally forgotten Afghanistan, it goes to the credit of the prominent academician and scholar, Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais, to come up with his highly informative and well-written book on Afghanistan. "War without Winners", with the sub-title "Afghanistan's uncertain transition after the Cold War". Despite Afghanistan's central role in the closing stages of the Soviet-American Cold War with Pakistan serving as the frontline state ready to take on Moscow with American prodding, the fact remains that a worthwhile study has not been produced either by the American or Pakistani scholars that really does an adequate postmortem of Afghanistan.

In this regard, "War without Winners" is a worthy exception to this norm since the author examines various stages of the conflict in Afghanistan without the ideological blinkers

that have often blurred an objective appraisal of the situation there. An example of this approach underlines the author's analysis of the Soviet military intervention which he rightly feels "was influenced by pragmatic, conventional political and security interests", including the need to sustain a friendly regime on its southern borders and the fear that the Afghan ruler of that period, Hafizullah Amin, needed to be removed before he could start acting like a 'Tito' or turn to China, Pakistan or the United States for assistance. In this context, the book dismisses motivations for Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 as being inspired from "expansionism" since in the words of the author, such a thesis has "serious shortcomings".

However, the record needs to be set straight on one crucial element concerning the US interest in Afghanistan since the author asserts that "even after the revolution (April 1978), the US, though concerned with the increasing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, did not make any move until the Soviet Union intervened militarily. The critics of US policy rightly asserted that it 'discovered' Afghanistan in December 1979". However, this statement is only partially correct.

Soon after the left-wing military coup in Kabul in April 1978, a high-level US delegation visited Pakistan and other countries of the region under the then US Under Secretary of State, David Newsom. Pakistan, which was then under a Martial Law regime, urged the United States to revive CENTO and offered a joint Pakistan-American covert operation to destabilise the new Afghan regime in what Pakistan presented to the visiting US delegation as a "new security threat to American interests in the region". Since the Shah of Iran was then perceived by Washington to be firmly in the saddle, the visiting American delegation was dismissive of Pakistan's offer and Pakistan's concern for the leftwing regime in Kabul did not evoke the kind of alarm bells in Washington that other pro-Soviet left-wing regimes in the Third World had done, say, in Angola, Ethiopia or South Yemen.

This US policy quickly changed after a couple of events in February 1979. In that month, the revolution in Iran had triumphed and three days after the announcement of the Islamic Republic on February 11, 1979, the American Ambassador in Kabul, Adolph Dubs, who was also a noted Soviet specialist at the State Department, was assassinated in

a shootout in Kabul. A hostile Iran, coupled with an already unfriendly Afghanistan, was a bit much for the Americans to swallow and the result was an emerging perspective of a "Crescent of Crisis" in strategic parts of the Muslim World.

The US quietly but quickly took remedial measures: The CIA started co-ordinating with its Pakistani counterpart to start the supply of military armaments to the Afghan Mujahideen, incidentally, without the knowledge of the Foreign Office, and in June 1979, the United States announced the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) whose area of responsibility was supposed to begin at Morocco and end at Pakistan and which has now been given the name of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). These steps, both the supply of arms to the Mujahideen via a CIA covert operation that was ultimately to bring in weapons worth \$2.1 billion and the establishment of the RDF were initiated well before the Red Army's intervention in Afghanistan.

It is not surprising that the biggest CIA covert operation after World War II would have the effect of making Pakistan's Afghan policy hostage to Washington's objectives. This dependence of Islamabad on Washington has been vividly brought out in "War without Winners" especially during two crucial stages of the Geneva talks that were being held under the United Nations auspices to seek a political settlement in Afghanistan. In the summer of 1983, there were signals, albeit hazy, that some sort of political settlement of the Afghan crisis was possible. But then, as the author notes: "Pakistan was told point-blank that Washington would not support what it called a 'flaky' settlement that did not include the participation of the Mujahideen in a future political settlement in Kabul." And as the author rightly adds that since it was "only at the risk of estrangement from Washington that Pakistan could procure a political settlement and Pakistan was not willing to sacrifice the strategic advantage of its security links with the United States by striking an independent deal with Moscow".

The second indicator of Pakistan's dependence on the United States for the Afghan policy came during "the final stages of the negotiations at Geneva when Pakistan, apparently under US influence, compromised its long-standing position on the formation of an interim government before the de-

parture of the Soviet troops". It was a strange swapping of positions by Moscow and Islamabad because for most of 1986-1987, the Soviet Union was insisting on agreement on an interim Afghan regime before giving an exact timeframe for the withdrawal of the Red Army, while Pakistan persisted with its argument that the only issue left then was a precise timeframe of the Soviet exit and "other matters" would be sorted out subsequently.

Much to Pakistan's surprise and chagrin, at a meeting in Geneva between the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States in November 1987, the two superpowers agreed with the formulation that had been presented by the Soviet Union, while Pakistan suddenly adopted what had till then been the Soviet position, namely, that an interim government must precede the timeframe for a Soviet withdrawal. But it was just too late and the Pakistani policy-makers had missed the bus.

The Americans felt they had "repaid the debt of Vietnam", with high interest probably, the Soviet Union had been bled enough and Mikhail Gorbachev was a man with whom Ronald Reagan could do business since he was pliable to American concerns and further destabilisation of the Soviet Union was no longer in Washington's interest. And by that time, the Americans had switched from supporting Zia to propping up Junejo because, in their view, General Zia had served their purposes and now, as far as Washington was concerned, Zia's utility to the Americans was outdated. The unravelling of the American involvement in Afghanistan marked the beginning of the end of General Zia himself. A 100 days after the Red Army's exit began, Zia himself was killed in what remains to date a mysterious air-crash.


It would have been useful if, for the purposes of his source material, Dr Rais had also consulted the two volumes on Afghanistan published by the Iranian students who captured the American Embassy in Tehran in November, 1979, since those two volumes include classified American cables pertaining to Afghanistan.

Finally, in terms of the fallout of the Afghan war, three aspects which have not been fully examined by the author in what is otherwise a solid reference work, need to be analysed. First, Pakistan paid a very heavy price for its pursuit of an Afghan policy that spawned the "Culture of Kalashnikovs", thereby destabilising most of urban Pakistan. Second, if the ultimate end of the Afghan policy was to prevent Pakistan being caught in a "nutcracker" situation between India and a pro-Soviet Afghanistan, that goal was achieved with the break-up of Soviet Union although it is an irony that the Indian pilots are apparently manning the Af-

ghan air force while the Pakistan Embassy was closed down after being ransacked. Third, in yet another historical irony, perhaps unwittingly the US created the spectre of "Islamic fundamentalism" by helping to train thousands of Muslim volunteers who fought in the Afghan war and who after sufficient battle-inoculation are providing the best fighters for a range of militant movements in the Muslim World in Palestine, Egypt, Algeria and the Occupied Kashmir!

The Nation

10/30



'Tempelchen' auf der Stadtmauer von Balkh

Book Reviews

Artyom Borovik, *The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990. Pp.288, 1 map, 8 pp. of photographs. \$19.95. ISBN 0-87113-283-4

Gennady Bocharov, *Russian Roulette: Afghanistan Through Russian Eyes*. New York: HarperCollins, 1990. Pp.188 \$18.95. ISBN 0-06-03110-3

These two books by Soviet journalists are the latest entries in a largely successful disinformation campaign designed to conceal a number of important facts about Soviet involvement in Afghanistan: that in reality the Soviet Union did not lose the war, did not remove its military presence, retains the capacity to use Afghanistan as a base for strategic power projection throughout the region and has continued to consolidate its control since its declared but unverified pullout of overt uniformed forces in February 1989.¹

The disinformation campaign's initial goal was to eliminate Afghanistan as a stumbling block to improved relations with, and especially economic assistance from, the West while deflecting international attention and leaving Moscow free to pursue its long-range regional strategy. That accomplished, it aims to dissipate or at least modify the stigma attached to Soviet actions in Afghanistan by concealing as much of the reality as possible, by modifying what cannot be wholly concealed, and by establishing a moral equation with US actions in Vietnam.

In the wake of the invasion, Soviet leaders began trying to defuse the unexpectedly strong international reaction by confiding to selected foreigners that they had stumbled into Afghanistan, that it had been a dreadful mistake (always attributed to someone other than the existing leadership), and that they were anxious to extricate themselves.² This initial theme was subsequently incorporated into a broader, more sophisticated campaign, but it remained low-key and sporadic for five or six years while Moscow stalled UN-brokered peace negotiations long enough to consolidate its organs of control; complete its strategic military bases at Shindand, Mazar-i-Sharif and elsewhere; terrorize the rebellious population; infiltrate and undermine the Resistance; and replace an ineffectual agent, Babrak Karmal, with the tougher and more effective Najibullah. By late 1986, these steps had been completed; at about the same time, the introduction of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles for the Resistance presented an unwanted new problem. Moscow was ready to move toward a settlement, aware that the West was weary of the issue and eager to eliminate a tedious impediment to relations with a USSR transformed by the apparently liberal Mikhail Gorbachev.

The more skilfully orchestrated, multifaceted, longterm campaign emerged with Gorbachev's famous (though extremely ambiguous) 'bleeding wound' statement. It continues, emphasizing now this note, now that. Recognizing that it cannot completely deny its role in Afghanistan, Moscow seeks to control the damage and reinforce its new image by acknowledging with regretful sighs a limited number of minimal guilts until Afghanistan slides down the public memory hole. Aimed at the international - and particularly the American - audience as much as at the disillusioned Soviet public (for whom the tune is somewhat different), its basic theme is Afghanistan as 'the Soviet Vietnam', a theme tailored to the Western penchant for mirror imaging combined with its desire to believe that the Afghan

The Worlds of Islam

Allah o akbar" — "God is great" — begins the call to prayer resonating from mosques in cities and villages from China to Morocco, from New York City to Timbuktu. It is also the war cry of Islamic militants throughout the Umma, the lands of the faithful.

As an Iranian transplanted in the West, I have long sought to understand the tensions in Muslim societies. For more than seven years, I traveled the Muslim world — 29 countries in all — to photograph the conflict between the people's desire for modernization and the rising political movement seeking inspiration from a mythical past.

In Egypt, I saw a female student, fully covered by veil, gloves and glasses, peering into a microscope. When I photographed Shiites rhythmically beating their bare chests during the mourning period of Ashura, only the tall buildings hovering over

made me aware that I was on Seventh Avenue in New York City.

By taking readers on a journey through the Muslim world, I hope to help them understand why we are witnessing a resurgence of Islam,

traditional and militant, in Western as well as Eastern societies.

— **ABBAS**, a Paris-based photo-journalist with Magnum Photos and author of the forthcoming "Allah O Akbar: A Journey Through Militant Islam."

A checkpoint on the road north from Kabul, Afghanistan, 1992.

David did indeed triumph over the Soviet Goliath.

These ideas have found ready acceptance among Western journalists and scholars, most of whom have little detailed knowledge about Afghanistan's realities, past or present, and all too often take Moscow's highly selective and carefully minimal 'mea culpa' as bona fides of a Soviet change of heart – and policy.

Bit by bit, one parallel after another (some true, some not?) has been slipped into the public picture: anguished and disillusioned soldiers, unwilling draftees, bereaved families, a search for MIAs, shame at atrocities by troops out of control, lack of national purpose, misguided leaders who stumbled into a morass and got bogged down, frustration and regrets. Lest the point be lost, Soviet sources occasionally refer (as both of these authors do) to 'our Vietnam', to 'not leaving hanging on to the helicopters' and (in 1988–89) to ostensible fears that their puppet regime would collapse and disappear once Soviet troops were withdrawn (which was never a serious possibility). The key element in the Soviet message is the suggestion that the Soviets lost the war, and, like the Americans in Vietnam, packed up and went home – a story designed to end international interest, leaving Moscow and its agents a free hand.⁴

By and large, the campaign has been successful – so much so that when Moscow agreed to a settlement it had been demanding all along, it won not only international acquiescence but praise and even, subsequently, a degree of sympathy. These two books are designed to forward the effort. At least one of them – Borovik's – appears to be succeeding: judging from reviews, most readers take it at face value and find it persuasive.

Both books are based on reports originally written for Soviet consumption, but have been edited to appeal to a Western, particularly an American, audience. Both are modeled on *Dispatches*, Michael Herr's book on Vietnam, and purport to give a journalist's frank, unfettered personal insights into what the Afghanistan war was really like, and conclude that, as General Sherman said, it was hell. In fact, however, both fit neatly into the design of the disinformation campaign: accurate information is intermingled with and falsified by half-truths and distortions – but far more importantly, all of the truly damning facts are very carefully omitted.

Bocharov, a correspondent for *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, is less well known outside the USSR than Borovik, and his book has received less attention. It is heavy handed, visibly manipulative, but its very crudity makes it useful as a guide to many elements of the disinformation campaign. His style is often smarmy and some of his errors and inventions are obvious even to a reader without special expertise; for example, when he purports to record the dying thoughts of men he never met or states that, until the Vietnam War, post-traumatic stress syndrome (also called shellshock or battle fatigue) was not only unrecognized by American doctors, but did not even exist.

Bocharov's ostensible subject is the suffering and disillusion of Soviet troops, whom he portrays as the true victims of a wretched, futile, failed war not of their making,⁵ a story to which Afghans are almost incidental. Afghans are consistently portrayed as ignorant, brutish, vicious and – explicitly – as animals, and much of what he says about Afghan society is simply not true.

His second purpose is to exonerate Gorbachev completely from any complicity in the war: he blames the invasion and all other Soviet misdeeds in Afghanistan entirely on Leonid Brezhnev and his associates (except for Gorbachev's mentor, Yuri Andropov).⁶

His third point – equivalency with Vietnam – is delivered with sledgehammer subtlety. After confirming total Soviet control of all Afghan government operations, for example, he writes, '... one state model ... was forced onto another country. This practice is not a Soviet invention. It has many originators and implementers. But nobody has ever applied it with such deceit and determination as the US and the Soviet Union!' [sic(!)]

His standard of reliability is established on the very first page with a grossly (and gratuitously) inaccurate account of the murder of US ambassador Adolf Dubs in February 1979, wrong even on such undisputed facts as where Dubs died,⁷ and the book goes downhill from there. Bocharov obviously assumes that his readers will not have enough background to question, let alone dispute, his facts or note the vast array of his omissions. In this, alas, he is probably correct; but for an informed reader, almost every paragraph – sometimes every sentence – demands correction.

Interestingly, however, a section apparently intended as a tribute to the courage and suffering of Soviet soldiers suggests, perhaps inadvertently, a level of medical care in the Soviet Army almost as primitive as what Florence Nightingale found at Scutari in 1854: the wounded scream and weep in agony; ambulatory patients must carry the stretcher cases to the dressing station where they are left lying on the floor, smoking hashish, to await attention; wounds suppurate and stink and the stench of death seeps through the wards. A less horrific account in Borovik's book supports this description, at least to a degree, as does the high ratio of deaths to injuries among Soviet troops.

It is hardly surprising that Artyom Borovik, the 31-year-old foreign editor of

LONG YEARS OF EXILE, CENTRAL ASIAN REFUGEES IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, Audrey C. Shalinsky, University Press of America, 1994. 182 pp.

Dr. Shalinsky, a professor of Anthropology at the University of Wyoming, began her field research on the Central Asian "Ferghanachi" muhajarin (Muslims who migrate for reasons of religion) in the brief period of the First Afghan Republic of Pres. Moh'd Daoud in 1976–77. That research was the basis for her Harvard University dissertation (1979) as well as for Central Asian Emigres in Afghanistan: Problems of Religious & Ethnic Identity, Occasional Paper #19 of the Afghanistan Council of The Asia Society (December 1979).

Her latest (but I am sure by no means final) research on this same group, many of them refugees again in Pakistan & even in the United States, is published in part in LONG YEARS OF EXILE & in part in "Women's Role in the Afghan Jihad," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 25: 4 (Fall 1993), pp. 661–675.

Thus, Audrey Shalinsky's study of this group is approaching its 20th anniversary. This is a remarkable length of time. It is particularly remarkable when one considers that it not merely considers its subject as a whole social science category, but considers the group as a whole while it focusses on a small group of them. In Central Asia this particular group resided in the small town of Kasan in the Ferghana Valley.

In the Soviet era, Stalin divided the Ferghana Valley between the Uzbekistan SSR & the Tajikistan SSR. This was but one instance of his policy of "divide & rule" through the establishment of various "ethnic" regions having differing degrees of political status & rights. Highest of all

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Ogunyuk, is a better writer (though given to strained pseudo-poetic metaphor), and much more skilful and sophisticated in tailoring his story to what a Western, especially an American, audience finds plausible. According to the book jacket, Borovik spent six years of his childhood in New York. His fluent, idiomatic American English, earnest manner and boyish good looks have made him a pet of the talk show circuit on his frequent visits to the US and landed him a slot as a contributing editor on *Regardie's* magazine.

The blurb omits certain other details of his background, however: his father, Gernykh Borovik (whose official biography does not mention the years in New York) is one of Moscow's most experienced active measures operatives: head of the Soviet Peace Council, deputy chairman of the World Peace Council, and reportedly brother-in-law of Vladimir A. Kryushkov, last head of the KGB.⁸

On the jacket of Borovik's book, Graham Greene is quoted – perhaps more accurately than he intended – as saying, 'This is literature, not reporting'. True enough – but the problem is, it purports to be reporting.

Borovik's manipulation of the facts has none of Bocharov's clumsiness. He is delivering the same messages, but cleverly and with some style – a telling adjective here, a phrase slipped in there, a quotation from a seemingly authoritative source, a few details that, though hardly noticed, create an effect – and always, of course, the significant omissions – all the while portraying himself as an earnest young reporter in pursuit of a tragic truth. A few examples will demonstrate:

His deceptive discussion of the origin of the invasion is characteristic:

He states in passing, as though it was accepted fact, that in spring 1979, 'the Kremlin was quite alarmed by *American activity in Afghanistan*.' [emphasis added]. But in spring 1979 there was no significant American activity in Afghanistan – and there never had been. As late as September 1979, despite the murder of its ambassador, despite the pre-invasion military buildup on the Soviet border, the US was offering no more than token support (if that) to the emerging resistance and rejecting approaches from the Kabul regime.

He quotes former Secretary of State Alexander Haig to the effect that he could 'see Brezhnev's logic' because 'any successful Islamic movement at your southern borders will inevitably influence the Soviet Muslim republics'. To most readers, a Secretary of State seems pretty authoritative; but Haig was no expert on obscure social movements in remote corners of Central Asia and unlikely to be aware that, until the Soviet invasion, there was no major radical Islamic movement in Afghanistan, although there surely was in Iran, which was not invaded.

He describes a resistance leader in London as staying in a 'luxurious' apartment building 'across from Hyde Park', implying high living in Mayfair. But Hyde Park has four sides. The building in question (which this reviewer has visited) is on a side street in unfashionable Bayswater and about as luxurious as a nice middleclass apartment house in Teaneck, NJ.

Borovik writes at length about Soviet defectors he met at a press conference at Freedom House at which this reviewer was also present. What appear to be separate one-on-one interviews with the defectors Nikolai Movchan and Igor Kovalchuk were actually part of a group session, which I observed, immediately after the press conference. Both are so significantly described as sweating and uncomfortable as to suggest that they were nervous, perhaps afraid to speak freely; in fact, Borovik and eight or nine others were crammed into a tiny, poorly ventilated office on a July day; everyone was sweating. (Oddly, details of his description of the building are accurate for the longtime headquarters from which Freedom House had moved a year earlier, but not the building to which he came.)

A later interview with another defector in San Francisco was reportedly obtained only by disguising Borovik's identity, which was revealed thanks to the chance presence of Movchan.

Most tellingly – because indicative of his selective handling of data – in what might appear to the average reader to be an unusually frank report on the decision to invade, Borovik quotes from his interview with Army General V. I. Varennikov, originally published in *Ogunyuk*, in which Varennikov complained angrily that the Soviet Army should not have 'allowed itself to be dragged into this drawn-out war'. But in this book, for an international readership, he omits the remainder of the interview as it appeared in the magazine, in which Varennikov went on to say that *the Soviet military won the war and withdrew from Afghanistan because its mission had been completed and Soviet forces were no longer needed* [i.e., to maintain the Najibullah regime in power].

Both writers reveal themselves most transparently by the vast lacunae in their ostensibly frank treatment of Soviet atrocities against Afghan civilians.⁹ That atrocities occurred is acknowledged: in view of widely disseminated reports by the UN and human rights organizations, a denial would lack credibility. But they are portrayed as spontaneous incidents,

were the Soviet Socialist Republics. Together, these were the constituent units in the political designation, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the USSR. The Russian SSR was but one of these units. Other ethnically based geographic & political entities were formed into units of lesser status with fewer political rights (Autonomous Regions, etc.). Needless to say, none of these divisions, including the Russian SSR, had any true autonomy or rights. Some, in fact, were ethnically, linguistically & culturally fairly homogeneous, i.e. the Armenian SSR. All were subject to the tyrannical whim of probably the most notorious & effective tyrant in history, Stalin. With his death in 1953, there was a relaxation of his terror; however, this by no means relaxed the fundamental dominance of Moscow over the entire USSR.

We see today, in the revival of imperialistic assertions of the "right & duty of 'new democratic'" Russia to control the "near abroad" of the former USSR, a revival of Moscow's view of its role in "its own" region. Chechnya is discovering that any genuine autonomy for an autonomous region merits a bloody military response. This is rapidly making Boris Yeltsin a ruler worthy of mention in the same breath with Ivan The Terrible & Stalin. However, many & perhaps most Russians, even large numbers in the military, make the analogy to the failed Soviet war in Afghanistan. For the Muslim Chechens the example of the Afghan jihad serves as an inspiration & demonstration of the ability of true Muslims to win over a seemingly invincible Russia.

The careful attention paid to history in LONG YEARS OF EXILE is one of its principal strengths. The author emphasizes the crucial

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described explicitly as 'our My Lais', the sporadic, unplanned actions of renegade or berserk individuals, 'Soviet Lieutenant Calleys'¹⁰, rather than what they actually were: a systematic policy of planned, organized terror designed to crush the Afghan population into submission, repeated throughout the entire country over a period of many years, using similar methods, often requiring sizable units, elaborate equipment and advance preparation.¹¹

Lesser war crimes are admitted in such a way as to deflect attention from the enormities of a considered policy of genocidal proportions. Ignoring the vast disparity in the numbers of deaths, the authors match those Soviet atrocities they report – relatively small incidents – with Afghan equivalents. (In one instance, the Soviet decapitation of elderly Afghan civilians in Istalif, reported by an eyewitness at human rights hearings in Oslo in 1983, is transformed into an atrocity by Afghans against Soviet troops in the same town.)

There is no possibility that either author was completely uninformed of the facts, at least in broad outline. It is not something of which the Soviet public is unaware.¹² From 1980 on, Radio Liberty, the Voice of America and the BBC broadcast many reports of massive atrocities into the Soviet Union. In 1986 *Izvestia* reprinted (in order to denounce it) the entire text of a full-page ad placed in *The New York Times* by the Afghanistan Relief Committee, describing the use of booby-trapped toys designed to maim children. Helsinki Watch published one of its reports in Russian and managed to distribute copies inside the USSR. The reports of the Special Rapporteur of the UN commission on Human Rights are available public documents, publicized by denunciations in the Soviet press. Borovik heard organized atrocities discussed at the Freedom House press conference. In any case, even if both writers had somehow managed to miss hearing a word about any of these reports, nobody who visits Afghanistan or the refugee camps in Pakistan even briefly can avoid hearing of massive and systematic atrocities from survivors and eyewitnesses.¹³

This omission alone is an indictment of both writers' credibility. It is worth noting that the most intensive campaigns against civilians, and the highest death rate, occurred in 1986 after Gorbachev came to power.

A full critique would require page by page analysis of both books; these examples will have to suffice. Each book contains some interesting information for those who can winnow it out, but as reports on the war in Afghanistan, neither is trustworthy. Both Borovik and Bocharov present the picture Moscow wishes to present to the world, with approved warts only – but for anyone who wants to see the brushstrokes going on the canvas, they can be useful.

ROSANNE KLASS
New York

NOTES

Rosanne Klass established and directed the Afghanistan/Southwest Asia program at Freedom House in New York, 1981–90. She is the author of two books and numerous articles and papers on the region and its issues.

1. See Klass (ed.), *Afghanistan – The Great Game Revisited*, Rev. 2nd ed. (New York: Freedom House, 1990) Chs.10, 14; Rep. Bill McCollum, 'A hollow accord in Afghanistan?', *Washington Times*, 9 May 1989; reports of the Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee: 'The Build-up of the Afghan Armed Forces' (undated, c. Nov. 1989); 'A Question of Trust – Was There Soviet Disinformation?' (6 March 1990); 'Tanai's Coup in Kabul' (31 March 1990).

See also: accusations of Soviet clandestine troop replacements made by President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan shortly before his assassination; and reports in the general press, the Pakistani press, FBIS reports and Resistance publications for 'Jowzjani' (Central Asian and Siberian KGB troops disguised as Afghans) and the Soviet presence at Jalalabad and Kandahar since 1989.

2. The sources of these confidences were usually anonymous 'high-level officials', although Armand Hammer, the first such conduit, quoted Brezhnev as his source. Craig R. Whitney, 'Armand Hammer Sees Brezhnev, Affirms Afghan Bid', *The New York Times*, 28 February 1980.
3. Those dealing with public sentiment probably have a good deal of truth; those dealing with government policy do not.
4. The illusion of defeat is created only by implication – or better still, by encouraging inferences which are then drawn by the targeted audience. Borovik, for example, implies a comparison between Afghanistan and the Russo-Japanese War. (Nobody has yet picked up that ball and run with it.) The Soviet leadership has never actually said that the Soviet armed forces were defeated. Aside from being untrue, such a public statement would not sit well with Soviet military leaders. The Soviet public is told that Soviet troops carried out 'their internationalist duty', painful though it was. For the outside world, the message is cryptically couched in sighs, hints, and

fact, almost uniformly held to be self evident by Russian scholars of the Tsarist era, that the predominant division within these societies was not ethno-linguistic. Rather, it was a division between settled population, both villagers & townspeople, the Sarts, & the nomads, who were virtually all Turkic. (There was a significant number of Arab true nomads whose language & culture were neither Arab nor Turkic; it was Persian. They considered themselves Arabs & this is supported by modern scholars (see Thomas J. Barfield, *The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan*, Austin, 1981). Economically, nomads were hearers [We know, editors are supposed to catch things like that but we liked it; it's in the same class with dairy farmers being moovers]. However, military superiority over settled populations often allowed plundering raids on villagers. The villagers were Tajiks & spoke the predominant Iranian dialect of Central Asia. Clearly, they predated nomads in the region. Urban populations as well were Tajik – merchants, artisans & humble people alike. There were some Turkic settled ex-nomads, both villagers & urban. These became "Tajikized." Successive waves of nomads arrived in the region down to the 19th century & those who settled, both urban & rural, became "Tajikized." All the urban-based dynasties, including the Manghit Uzbek tribe which was ruling the Emirate of Bukhara at the time of the Russian conquest were of nomad origin. On becoming rulers, however, they became "Persianized," not "Tajikized." Their court language & culture were the literary "classical" Persian of the Muslim elites from Iran to Bengal.

The author clearly demonstrates who were the inhabitants of the small town of Kasan. They were

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ambiguities from which others are left to draw the desired conclusion. Meanwhile, the officers who planned and conducted the Afghan war – e.g. Generals Yazov and Gromov – were rapidly promoted to the top of the Soviet military heap – not the usual consequence of failure.

5. Official Soviet casualty figures for more than nine years of war, considered reliable by Western experts, total 13,310 deaths and 35,478 injured (a large percentage of both from accidents and disease, especially hepatitis and dysentery). This is close to the rate of deaths and injuries in Soviet military training exercises. The Afghan people suffered an estimated 1.5 million civilian deaths, 10 to 12 per cent of the total prewar population.
 6. Brezhnev said others made the final decision to invade without his knowledge while he was ill. Each of his successors, including Gorbachev, has blamed it on Brezhnev and others safely dead. But as early as 1983, the then-obscure Gorbachev – along with Andropov – was identified as one of those who gave the final go-ahead for the invasion. See Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Yuri Andropov: A Secret Passage Into the Kremlin* (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p.183.
 7. Since this information was accurately reported by TASS in 1979, he has no excuse. See Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), p.99, n.144; Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), p.79; Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp.64–65, n.33.
 8. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *The KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990).
 9. The Soviet war was waged almost entirely against the civilian population – the support base of the Resistance – rather than against the Resistance itself, which was seldom targeted except in response to attacks.
 10. In the late 1980s the Soviets instituted criminal charges in a single case – an officer and a private accused of panicking and killing five or six passengers in a car; both were sentenced to prison. It was widely reported in the Soviet press as 'our My Lai'. Bocharov devotes several pages to this 'fight against evil', noting that 'Markov's defense reminded the tribunal of the case of Lieutenant Calley'. On the next page, he reports a gruesome atrocity deliberately carried out by Afghan women and children.
 11. For a discussion of the systematic nature of Soviet atrocities against Afghan civilians, see, *inter alia*: Dr Claude Malhuret, 'Report from Afghanistan', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.62, No.2 (Winter 1983–84) Also see Laber and Rubin, *Tears, Blood and Cries*, (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1984); Laber and Rubin, *A Nation Is Dying* (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1985); *Final Report, International Afghanistan Hearings*, Oslo, February 1984; Klass (ed), *Afghanistan – The Great Game Revisited*, 2nd ed., New York: Freedom House, 1990, numerous entries; Revel, Klass articles in *The National Review*, 4 October 1985; testimony given by various witnesses before the Joint Senate-House Task Force on Afghanistan, 1985–88. See also sources listed in note 12 below.
 12. Writing in *Moscow News* on 11 June 1989, Leonid Batkin observed that 'Everywhere in the world it is known that in Afghanistan our army resorted to actions against civilians which are qualified in international conventions signed by this country as crimes against humanity . . .' On 28 November 1989, as reported in *Pravda* of 30 November, the Supreme Soviet approved a resolution which granted an amnesty to Soviet soldiers for war crimes committed in Afghanistan. Article 4 of the draft resolution, which provided *inter alia* that the amnesty 'did not apply to individuals who took part in the premeditated murder of people' was omitted on a roll-call vote . . . Dr William Maley, University College, University of New South Wales, *Commentary*, April 1991.
- For an analysis of the systematic nature of Soviet atrocities against Afghan civilians, see, *inter alia*: sources cited in note 11 above; *By All Parties to the Conflict: Violations of the Laws of War in Afghanistan* (New York: Helsinki Watch/Asia Watch, 1988); *Final Report, International Afghanistan Hearings*, Oslo, February 1984; Elmi, *Afghanistan: a Decade of Sovietization* (Peshawar: Afghan Jihad Works Translation Center, 1988); *Letter from the B.I.A.: Afghanistan People's Tribunal, Stockholm 1981 – Paris 1982* (Bureau International Afghanistan, Paris 1983); numerous reports in the general press of Europe and the United States; *Report(s) on the situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Felix Ermacora, in Accordance with Human Rights Commission Resolution 1985/88*, UN Commission on Human Rights, twice annually since 1985; reports issued by Afghan Resistance organizations and the Afghan Information Center Bulletin, Peshawar, 1981 to date.
- Since this policy of anti-civilian atrocities was mentioned at the press conference at Freedom House which Borovik attended and describes in his book, there is no possibility that he was totally unaware of it.
13. For more details, see, in addition to the sources already cited: Arthur Bonner, *Among the Afghans* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1987); Philippe Augoyard, *La Prison pour Delit d'Espoir* (Paris: Flammarion, 1985), Michael Barry, *Le Royaume de l'Insolence* (Paris: Flammarion, 1984), Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports and general press reports, 1983–88.

Sarts speaking Tajik (and some Uzbek). Politically they were under the rule of the Khan of Kokand. Kokand had been a part of the Bukharan emirate until a revolt of a Ming tribe of Uzbeks in the mid 19th century. The Ming had ruled intermittently in Ferghana since the beginning of the 18th century.

The Russian conquest of Central Asia began in earnest in 1855. By 1868 they occupied Samarkand & the Emir of Bukhara was forced to sign a treaty & become a Russian protectorate. The Khanate of Khiva became a Russian protectorate in 1873. Kokand, however, was abolished on its surrender in 1876 & placed directly under Russian military rule. The Russians reported hundreds of violent revolts through the rest of the century. Many were inspired by Islam & were considered to be a jihad. The Ferghana revolt in 1885, aimed at the restoration of the Kokand emirate, was put down & a number of its leaders executed.

Shalinsky reports on the effects of these revolts on Kasan. Presumably they shared in the spirit of resistance to Russian rule along with other Ferghanans, but Kasan was not a center of revolt. Their historical memory of such an event would have been a central part of their tradition at the time of their own hijrah to Afghanistan. The first exile of the Kasanis took place following Stalin's decision in 1928 to end his "soft" policy of accommodation with Islamic norms as long as real control was conceded by the Muslim "nationalities." Even the shariah had been restored by Stalin. It was now abolished; mosques & Islamic schools were closed & ordinary mullahs executed. The Kasani residents of Kunduz, Afghanistan, in the 1970s (some of whom in

The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 1991.

Reviewer's note:

This was of course written before the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991, which led to Kryushkov's ouster as head of the KGB and, a few months later, the collapse of the Soviet Union. Borovik, previously a talk show favorite, has pretty much vanished from view since Kryushkov's downfall. — RK

(like many such scholarly journals, it did not come out till a more than a year after its official date)

their youths were residents of Kasan), dated their decision to flee Soviet rule to the period following Stalin's actions against Islam in 1928.

Another strength of this volume is its exceptional continuity. This allows it to demonstrate the lives of the Kasanis in three distinct settings & historical eras, i.e., in their homeland, as muhajirin in Kunduz, & following the communist coup of 1978 in their refuge in Afghanistan.* Although one individual did join the staff of the Uzbek-language regime weekly newspaper, overwhelmingly, they were staunchly opposed to any communist regime. Sayid Harun, a young religious leader of the community, was executed by the Taraki regime in 1978. The Kasanis of Kunduz began to plan to flee Afghanistan for Pakistan, becoming refugees for the sake of Islam once again.

The final section of Dr. Shalinsky's study deals with the community in Pakistan. However, by no means all the Kasanis of Kunduz became mujahirin. Many remained in Afghanistan & established their own mujahidin unit - naturally named for Sayid Harun Shahid, the first but by no means the last martyr of the Kasanis of Ferghana in the Afghan jihad.

Thus, LONG YEARS OF EXILE, above all a study of a particular tiny group of muha-jirin, tells us their fascinating story, but it illustrates in general the nature of the entire jihad. This jihad, for the rank & file &, I believe, for the overwhelming number of commanders & even party leaders, was primarily an Islamic religious duty. Its basic constituent groups were the same kind of small group as that of the Kasanis of Kunduz. Whatever has happened during & after the jihad's taking of Kabul in 1992 cannot take away its most essential identity.

All of these points of Dr. Shalinsky's scholarly achievement pale when compared to what I believe to be the greatest strength of all revealed here. This is the beauty, passion & love for her adoptive family & community. Professional competence & even brilliance, essential as it is in scholarly analysis, is not synonymous with detachment. People are first of all human before the social scientist views them as data. This author treats them as humans deserve to be treated. Only in this way can analysis approach truth.

*[sic] Pakistan?

Ralph Magnus
Monterey, California

ISLAMIC ART - continued from p.26
grated with close analysis of individual works of art (and here special praise should go to the accounts of, say, the Qalaun complex in Cairo; the mosques of Baybars and al-Muayyad in Cairo, Uc Serefeli in the Turkish city of Edirne, the Fishermen in Aigiers, the Suleymaniye in Istanbul and the Selimiye in Edirne; and the Taj Mahal). It is no mean achievement to put these ideas across in clear expository prose. And the text often sparkles; one Iranian Safavid image is economically and vividly described as depicting "a potbel-
lied slipshod slob smoking an opium pipe," while we are told of the greatest Ottoman architect, Sinan, that "his name has attracted buildings with the same power that George Washington's name has attracted beds." The illustrations are usually on the same page as the relevant discussion; in fact, the book has been beautifully designed so that there is a seamless sequence of plans, sections, drawings, monochrome and color plates. Simplified city plans (for instance Meknes, Bukhara, Isfahan, Delhi) help to amplify the context of the discussion, while some of the more detailed drawings, like that of the Qalaun complex in Cairo, are a substantial improvement on what has been published so far. The deliberate focus on securely dated or provenanced works of art puts the discussion on a solid factual basis, as does the giving of measurements.

The decision not to hide behind the major dynasties has led the authors to undertake much pioneering

research. There is the first attempt to claim the middle ground between a detailed monograph and a superficial paragraph for such topics as the art of the Shaibanids of Central Asia, the Hafsid of Tunis and the Sultanate (pre-Mogul) dynasties in India. Thus provincial styles stand out with new clarity, to say nothing of the many pointers to future research in these chapters. The authors' capacity to see the whole picture bespeaks mature judgment and a knowledge of Islamic art that is both profound and extensive, and that is based on decades of firsthand experience. Two minds are better than one, and the particular interests and expertise of this husband-and-wife team of independent scholars are complementary, both in media and in area studies. Their five years of editing the Islamic section of the Macmillan Dictionary of Art have given Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom an enviable range and depth of experience whose combination in two people takes them as a team to a level that no single scholar of Islamic art today could match.

Certain themes stand out with particular clarity. The role of Europe is a leitmotif in a way it never was in Islamic art before 1250. It makes itself felt in borrowings from Christian iconography in Mongol Iran, enameling, colored stone inlays and cameo cutting in Mogul India or textiles in Turkey, Baroque detailing in architecture continued on p. 35

Origin of Pushtu Literature in Pushtoon life

Pushtu literature has developed along with the socio-economic life of Pushtoons, passing through various stages and reaching the present time.

While talking about Pushtu literature, one forthwith touches upon Pushtu language. The concept of Pushtu is sometimes used as traditional legislations and regulations of Pushtoons. But in terms of language, Pushtu is a subject to be discussed by linguists. As for the former concept, i.e., Pushtu in terms of traditional code and codex, it is subject the anthropologists should deal with.

Here, we would like to elaborate a little on Pushtu literature. When discussing it in terms of history, literacy analysis shows that the first available Pushtu poetry and literature are the result of a long historical development in the socio-economic life of Pushtoons. Thus, one may say that the Pushtu language has two types of poems and literature: one is the written literature of the commons. The courses of development of both these literary forms are different from each other.

The oral literature is a direct reflection of the ethnic make-up of the Pushtoon society. Since this make-up does not rapidly undergo a change, it has remained for centuries as it is. Therefore, the mental and literary reflection of this social structure, i.e., the oral literature, also does not change rapidly and remains, to a large extent, stable both in terms of content and form. Hence, it is difficult to study its historical change and development. It, however, possesses very high and profound significance as far as poem and art are concerned.

The written literature is also there, in the course of development of Pushtu

the language. As the language came nearer to the urban life (the scientific, literary and cultural language in the city was Persian or Dari), it creatively adopted both the forms and contents of Dari literature. This was a major advance in the development of Pushtu.

The oral literature of Pushtu has many forms. We study the oral literature because it is one of the main sources of the contemporary written Pushtu literature. And it is inspired, among other things, fortunately by folk songs.

The folk songs were said by those who didn't know how to read and write. This has led to the common poets' being void of any foreign influence. They did not have any model at hand to imitate, nor were there any poetic rules enforced to be observed. They were therefore compelled to employ their own initiative and create original poetry. Their compulsion has brought about such a literature that enjoys a major poetic significance, genuinely reflecting the spirit of people.

There is an extensive diversity of forms in which this type of literature has been shaped, possessing particular patterns of rhythms and rhymes incomparable with those of other literatures. One of the distinctive features of the oral literature is that it is linked with music and is sung as folk songs. Moreover, it is very simple and free from any Sufist expression of love and affection. It does not exalt any power, Khan or chieftain. Nor does it play with words, or praise, as the written literature, the qualities of the chap.

Avoiding a sidetrack discussion, one can put it straightly that ancient songs are greatly important for the oral literature. "The form and content of

these songs, show that Pushtoons' old songs are a continuation of the Arian early Vedic and Avestan anthems, serving as a golden link between Pushtu literature and the ancient literary part of Ariana".

That part of Pushtu literature which traces back to the Ariana early Vedic and Avestan anthems is, in fact, the beginning of Pushtu written literature. The ancient Pushtu poet, as the author of Zarina Tsanga (Golden Branch) writes, belongs to the literate and well-to-do segment of Pushtoons and were said generally by political leaders, spiritual instructors, sufists and sheikhs. He believes that such poetry is all made of verses and lines, a make-up typical of Vedic and Avestan anthems and exactly borrowed by Pushtu. It has still remained, apart from old songs, in those songs of common literature whose poets are known, with the only difference that in common songs the first line of the verse known as Kasser is very different in terms of its structure from the remaining lines. However, in ancient songs, the first line of the verse has as many syllables as the other lines, varying only in rhymes, and defines the way other rhymes of the poetry should follow.

According to the same author, the very ancient parts of Zend-Avesta called the Gatses, original anthems said by the great Zoroaster himself, are formed in lines similar, to a large extent, to our old songs.

In his book, Brief History of Afghanistan, Professor Abdul Hai Habibi very concisely refers to the implications pre-historical civilizations, i.e., the periods of Veda and Avesta, have had on the contemporary languages of Afghanistan. In particular, he speaks about the Pushtu language and literature: "According to a linguistic

comparison, the impacts of both these languages (Vedic and Avestan—M. A.) on the Afghan languages and proper names are evident. Many old words are still alive and used with keeping their historical meanings. Such historical terms have been preserved particularly by Pushtu language and some dialects spoken in the North-Eastern mountainous regions in Afghanistan".

Similarly, the author of Zarina Tsang compares in his book according to syllables the technical aspects of the first Pushtu poems with the Gatses of Avesta, making an exhaustive analysis. Following his efforts he quotes as an example Avestan anthems. There is a fervent prayer in Rig-Veda as follows:

"The Almighty God owns the life.

He is the all-property owner.

He grants decent family to men.

Oh God! We are thy slaves.

May thou not make us die before giving as A child of blessing us with benevolence."

One would face the following verse in Gatses:

"...May the Ormazd in his jurisdiction,

Grant us form and job, So that we may build up our family!"

In his prayer Bate Nika says:

"Oh Almighty God! Almighty God!

Everywhere, in the name of thy love,

The mountains are posing

All the creatures lamenting.

There are the mountain sides,

Where all our tens are May thou increase our people!

Oh Almighty God! Almighty God!

We have kindled our fire.

Here in a small hut and

hearth.

We live and survive by
thy love,

Not going to support an-
yone else.

Sky and the Earth are
thine

Secret of the dead is th-
ine

Things are in thy due
care.

Oh Almighty God! Alm-
ighty God!

Late Professor Benawa
in his book the Celebrit-
ies of Afghanistan writes:
"If one compares this val-
uable poem of Bate Nika
with the old book of Ari-
ans' Rig-Veda, he will not-
ice how similar it is, in
terms of thinking and con-
tent, with ancient Arian
thought."

According to Gostaw
Lobon, to Arians the fam-
ily was a privity phenom-
enon. This sanctity can be
seen in both Arian and old
Pushtu songs.

But, when studying the
origin of the written poet-
ry in Pushtu language,
the student recalls the
famous poetic self-
glorification said by
Amir Korrer, the
World Knight, in 760
A.D. The researches, how-
ever, believe though no
written Pushtu poem has
been found in the Seven-
th Century, they cannot
maintain, given the cul-
tural events in the past ce-
nturies, including the wo-
rk of Amir Korrer, that
it would be the first Pushtu
poem—since it must
have passed through its
developmental stages
being so mature and polis-
hed.

On the other hand, old
Pushtu songs, Pushtu Lan-
dai in particular, since
long have been an artis-
tic and poetic legacy of
this language in which
there repose beauty, art
and message. It exem-
plifies the talent and apti-
tudes of both Pushtu lan-
guage and the people. Thus
the researchers are of the
opinion that Korrer's glor-
ification is the first avail-
able written Pushtu po-
em rather than the first
Pushtu poetry.

Following Korrer's fam-
ous poem, Pushtu literatu-
re has inherited, in the co-
urse of its development,
a poetry formed in the Lo-
khan family of Ghazni. It
is said in a very old Pushtu
dialect and called by
researchers the Khaljani
language.

In the second Century
of Islamic era, Pushtu lit-
erature enjoys, intellectu-
ally and morally, exclu-
sive fabric and charac-
ter. National valour, pride
on one's own might, trav-
ersing the path of fortitu-
de and manhood are traits
reflected in Korrer's self-
glorification, which dem-
onstrates also the stren-
th and power of Pushtu
language.

In his book History of
Pushtu Literature, Profes-
sor Abdul Hai Habibi con-
siders Korrer's work as
different from the cover-
sational process of the con-
temporary language. The
poem, he stresses, denotes
that "in the the Seventh
and Eight centuries A.D.
Pushtu language was un-
mixed with any other lan-
guages, preserving this
purity until early 11th ce-
ntury. As it passed throu-
gh several centuries in
the Islamic era, Pushtu lost
its purity by embracing
new elements."

To sum up our discussi-
on, let's make some con-
cluding remarks. The con-
temporary Pushtu literature
has developed in step with
the traditional and very
primitive way of Pushtu-
ons' life, emerging first, in
oral and then written for-
m. Pushtu oral literature
and, hence the written one,
is linked with the old
Arian literary works. In
other words, it is a contin-
uation of that old civiliza-
tion through the Pushtu
language. Pushtu written
literature begins in the
wake of the emergence of
Islamic era, and develops
under Christian cultural
influence. The famous po-
etic glorification by Amir
Korrer is the first avail-
able piece.

Kabul Times

4/20/93

ISLAMIC ART continued from p. 33

from Turkey to Algeria, and more gen-
erally in the traditions of portraiture
and naturalism. Europe after 1250 had
a negative influence too, in that by un-
dercutting Islamic products it hastened
the demise of certain Islamic crafts,
like the textile industry in later Mame-
luke Egypt, operating in this way like a
medieval equivalent of today's Taiwan
or Korea. And its characteristic modes
of expression consistently failed to
blend with those of the Islamic world.
The vanished religious complexes of
Rashid al-Din in Tabriz are identified as
the sources for some of the most inno-
vative architecture of the powers who
controlled the Middle East — Mame-

lukes, Timurids and early Ottomans —
and as a result Tabriz, so often neglect-
ed today because of its meager tally of
surviving monuments, is restored to its
rightful geopolitical role.

International Timurid art — a
newly coined term intentionally de-
rived from International Gothic, and
possessed of many of the same conno-
tations — is scrutinized both as a
source for later styles and as an instru-
ment of legitimacy and prestige. Many
examples are given of the way tradi-
tional texts can be manipulated to con-
vey contemporary messages, often of
a politically sensitive nature; and given
the essentially private context of book
painting as an art, and its often royal

patronage, this is not surprising. Similarly, buildings
and their inscriptions can be given a contemporary
resonance, as in the Anatolian cities of Nigde and
Bursa. Migrant artists forced to leave their homeland
by war, persecution or economic hardship (especially
those from the turbulent Turkoman territories of Cen-
tral Asia in the 15th century) are revealed as a major
instrument of change from Tunis to Bukhara; this is
how the nebulous "influences" between styles and tech-
niques thousands of miles apart actually operated. The
role of Iran as the successor to the Abbasid caliphs who
dominated much of early Islamic history is highlighted.
Links between the arts and their constituent media are
traced back to the newly significant role of paper,
which encouraged the manufacture of designs capable
of re-use on a large or small scale in all kinds of media.
Archaism is another recurrent theme, and can be seen
as a barometer of failing self-confidence in the face of
political difficulties or of European expansion.

In accordance with the redesign that Yale University
Press has given to the Pelican History of Art series,
the book is lavishly illustrated in color, often in full-
page plates. (One minor niggles: the designer ought
to have insured that every page has a number, since the
frequent absence of pagination means it takes longer to
find information.) The cumulative effect of these color
plates is to emancipate Islamic art from its "black and
white period." And so the objects can speak for them-
selves. This is no small matter, for Islamic art, definite-
ly including architecture, relies on color for its most
characteristic effects. In many earlier handbooks that
crucial dimension is lost. Now the lay reader and
scholar alike can appreciate its full impact, and for
many the effect will be to transform their pictures of
Islamic art. This, then, is a book to savor: physically
beautiful, its text a triumphant vindication of the tradi-
tional handbook, its wealth of ideas opening many new
vistas. Altogether it represents a giant leap forward in
the knowledge of later Islamic art. What we now need
from this team is a history of Islamic art in its entirety.
The earlier centuries of that art have already been
covered in the Pelican series by Richard Ettinghausen
and Oleg Grabar, but the need remains for a weighty
one-volume history. □

Robert Hillenbrand is the Professor of Islamic Art at
the University of Edinburgh and the author of "Islamic
Architecture: Form, Function and Meaning."

THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

As a result of the continuing large numbers of displaced people arriving from Kabul, the Nangarhar authorities and UNOCHA agreed to open a new camp on 8 October at a site 7 kms south of Jalalabad city known as New Hadda. By 18 October there were already 2,000 families (14,000 persons) living in the camp. At the same time Sar Shahi camp has been extended with a further 3 blocks completed, accommodating 8,000 persons. In spite of these developments there are still many families living at Sar Shahi who have not yet been registered for assistance. As at 18 October the following numbers were living in the camps near Jalalabad.

<u>Camps</u>	<u>Families</u>	<u>Persons</u>
Mumtaz	1,000	7,000
Hadda	2,104	14,728
Samarkhail (ICRC)	6,300	44,000
Sar Shahi	16,630	128,148
New Hadda	2,000	14,000
Total:	28,034	207,876

Mazar-i-Sharif

There are 27,274 displaced persons from Kabul living in camps in Northern Afghanistan, assisted by the United Nations agencies.

Herat

In the past week 11,098 Afghan refugees returned from Iran, more than half of whom headed to Herat province.

Kabul's money market remains closed

KABUL, Dec. 7: The Kabul central money market remained closed on Wednesday for the second straight day — a problem attributed to the recent issue of new currency notes.

A money changer said the government had temporarily closed the market in a bid to stabilise the conversion rate of the Afghani, which has dropped against foreign currencies.

One dollar could fetch around 4,400 Afghanis before the market was closed while the conversion rate Wednesday was between Afs 4150 and 4200.

Government officials said such shutdowns in the past had im-

proved the value of the Afghani. Another reason cited was the prevailing difference between the value of the new Afghani 500 and 10,000 notes and the previous 1,000s.

The new notes have been declared illegal by factions opposing Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The factions allow no one to carry them into areas under their control.

As local traders need old notes to buy things in the territory controlled by Rabbani's rivals, where merchandise cost less, the value of 1,000 denomination notes has gone up.

French scholar Sylvie Heslot has been studying birthing customs in Afghanistan. The lullabye on the right appeared in issue #66 of LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN, winter 1994.

In Dehshghanan, a foodstuffs bazaar, the sellers offer two different prices for the same goods — five to six per cent less if payment is made in 1,000s.

A man carrying a half-filled sack of wheat flour on his bicycle said he purchased seven kilos for Afs 8,600 with the new money, while he could buy it for 8,100 if he had the old notes.—AFP

LULLABYE

Reprise de B sans le premier ver

â lalo lalo lalo
â djân-e padar lalo
batchem ma maktab bera
maktab-a bokhwāna
ba khubi kāmīyāb chawa

â lalo lalo lalo
batche ma doktor chawa
â lalo lalo lalo
batche ma indjinyar chawa

Reprise de B
batche ma ostāz chawa

â lalo lalo lalo
hamicha kāmīyāb chawa
â lalo lalo lalo
batche ma pilot chawa
tayāra parwāz kona
watan-a ābād kona

Reprise de B
nānech bar-e kārech rafta
bābech ba chekār rafta

â lalo lalo lalo
ay djân-e mādār lalo
do dide rochan-e mādār lalo
tcherāgh-e rochan-e pedar lalo

â lalo lalo lalo
nechāni mādār lalo
golmore mādār lalo

Reprise de B sans le premier ver

batche ma ostāz chawa
khalqhā rā dars beta
ba hamicha kāmīyāb chawa
sorkh ruy sar boland chawa

Reprise de B sans le premier ver.

â djân-e mādār lalo
golmore mādār lalo
kākolzari mādār lalo
māh pechāni mādār lalo

â lalo lalo lalo
â lalo tchutchā lalo
â lalo-e hamāsi
tandur-e dāgh o nān-e bāsi

â lalo lalo lalo
â lalo tchutchā lalo
â djân-e mādār lalo
tu da kojā lalo
ba sar-e tchechmā lalo
â lalo lalo lalo
ba sar-e zānu lalo
ba gahwāra mähwāri lalo

â lalo lalo lalo
tu djân-e mādār lalo
dokhtarakam golwār ast
tchechmakhā-yach bolbol wāri.
â lalo lalo lalo
lāb o dānech gol wāri-st
dokhtarak-a khao borda
kolāyech-a babao borda

â lalo lalo lalo
tu da kojā lalo
ba sar-e zānu lalo
sar-e gahwāra lalo

Reprise de A
â lalo lalo lalo

The following extracts are from REFUGEES (published by UNHCR), #98. V01. IV - 1994. The issue focuses on "After the Soviet Union."

One of the most serious conflicts since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been in Tajikistan, where in 1992 a civil war broke out. Hundreds of thousands of Tajik refugees fled to Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Because of the intermixture of ethnic groups (for instance, neighboring Uzbekistan, the most populous of the Central Asian states, has 950,000 Tajiks and 850,000 Kazakhs, while about 2.5 million Uzbeks live outside of Uzbekistan, half of them in Tajikistan), Tajikistan's porous border with Afghanistan, and the fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the conflict in Tajikistan has major implications for the entire sub-region. (p. 8)

Russia is a country unused to refugees. For most of its history, Russia's borders have been closed both to people trying to get in and to people trying to get out. But the collapse of the Soviet Union changed that and opened Russia to the outside world – and the outside world came to Russia.

In the past, the Soviet Union accepted very few refugees, mostly revolutionaries and communists fleeing persecution. But now more than a million refugees and migrants have flooded into Russia from the republics of the former Soviet Union. Tens of thousands more have come from places as far-flung as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Somalia, hoping for asylum and using Russia as a stepping stone to Western Europe.

According to the Federal Migration Service (FMS), the arm of the Russian government dealing with migrants, there are about 500,000 officially registered migrants and refugees from the former USSR in Russia, and as many as 2 million who have not been registered. In comparison, UNHCR has registered more than 60,000 foreigners from outside the former Soviet Union. (p. 10)

Stuck in Russia with no recognized papers and no work, refugees have become targets for the police, who frequently arrest, harass and extort money from them. According to figures from the UNHCR reception center in Moscow, 400 incidents of police harassment were reported in the first six months of 1994. More than half of them were against Somalis and Angolans, despite the fact that they make up only 13 percent of non-CIS refugees in Russia. The darker the skin color and the more the person stands out, the more police attention they receive. Afghan and Iraqi refugees are also targeted because they resemble the black-haired peoples of the Caucasus, whom the police accuse of bringing crime to Russia.

"As soon as the police see your black hair, they think you are a bandit or a drug dealer," said Sharif, a 32-year-old refugee from Afghanistan.


In an example of what can happen with no legal protection, 21 Afghan refugees were forcibly deported back to Afghanistan from the

Krasnodar region of southern Russia in early August. The FMS said that the deportations were legal because the Afghans had not applied for refugee status. But UNHCR workers who travelled to Krasnodar were told that the regional government refuses to accept applications for refugee

The deportation brought a strong protest from UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, which complained to the Russian government that the deportations were contrary to the 1951 Convention. The protest note added that UNHCR "sees this incident in the wider context of the generally deteriorating protection situation of asylum-seekers and refugees in the territory of the Russian Federation."

"Those Afghans were in Russia illegally," said Arkhipov of the FMS. "Besides, we don't have a communist government here anymore, so why should we accept these refugees who supported communism in their own country?" (p. 12)

**Afghan and Iraqi
refugee children in
a kindergarten
at the Zelenogradsky
accommodation center
outside Moscow.**



CHRONOLOGY

10/16 - The News (Pakistan) - The 1st Int'l Islamic Artisans-at-Work Festival in Islamabad ended yesterday. Afghan craftsmen won awards in ceramics, colored glasswork & textiles. While Iranian artisans received the most prizes, Afghanistan was 2nd. The festival closed with a colorful ceremony:

The ceremony was followed by a fascinating cultural programme in which glimpses of various cultures were presented by troupes representing Central Asian Islamic Republics and China. The entire ceremony was like a fairy tale with young female artistes dancing to the beat of the drum entralling

all those present on the occasion.

Outside the Jinnah Hall, national cultural groups were presenting regional and traditional dances wearing colourful dresses. Their presentation was so tasteful that no passer-by could pass them without watching their performance for some time. (See p. 15)

10/20 - Frontier Post -



11/15 - PT - Indonesia has provided a C-130 military aircraft to the ICRC for airlifting medical supplies for those wounded in the drawn out fighting around Kabul. The airlift began last Friday. There have been 3 flights so far & 3 more are scheduled for Jalalabad & Bagram.

11/17 - PT - The NWFP Food Minister has called for a closer scrutiny of essential food prices. He is concerned about an increase in smuggling of flour, wheat, ghee & other food items to Afghanistan.

11/23 - PT - US Asst. Sec'y of State Robin Raphel visited Afghanistan & Pakistan & then stopped in Rome to visit Zahir Shah. The ex-King & Raphel urged all Afghans to support the UN's peace efforts.

11/25 - PT - A UN report on the Human Rights situation in Afghanistan says that the situation is completely out of control because there is no central gov't to be made accountable. The report says that Afghanistan has been divided into 4 zones, each with a local army. Political groups & armed men have established prisons all over the country & UN & ICRC observers are not allowed to visit these jails. (See p. 10)

12/1 - PT - The US declared a "state of emergency" in Kabul as the fighting has intensified. USAID announced that "it is preparing to provide emergency assistance in response to the crisis." Kabul has no running water, no electricity, & this winter food & fuel shortages are expected. The influx of refugees in Jalalabad - over 200,000 Kabulites with 150,000 more expected - threatens to overwhelm the makeshift facilities there.

12/2 - PT - Pakistan will give Afghanistan Rs. 50m for repair & patch work of the roads from Spin Boldak to Torghundi - through Kandahar & Herat.

12/4 - PT - The UN Security Council welcomed the "acceptance of the warring parties" of a step-by-step process of nat'l reconciliation (see resolution pp. 6-9). - A team of eye specialists from Rawalpindi spent 8 days treating patients in Herat.

12/5 - PT - The OIC will sponsor talks among Afghan leaders in Tehran next week.

12/7 - PT - Pakistan asked the int'l community to collaborate in helping Afghanistan build a stable political & economic environment.

12/8 - Two UN supply convoys, the first in 6 months, arrived in Kabul. One will distribute supplies in Rabbani's area, the other in Gulbuddin's. (See p. 9)

12/8 - PT - Kabul's money market has been closed for 2 days because of problems attributed to the recent issue of new currency notes. (See article on p.37.)

12/9 - PT - The OIC-sponsored talks in Tehran (see 12/5) concluded with agreement on a 3-point peace formula: pursuit of nat'l reconciliation & a durable peace; establishment of a cease-fire; creating a mechanism for the transfer of power to an interim gov't & the establishment of a permanent political infrastructure in Afghanistan.

12/14 - PT - Mine clearance officials estimate that between 10 & 20m mines will be cleared in Afghanistan in the next 4 to 6 years. Since many of the mines are in unmapped locations, it will be impossible to completely clear the country of mines.


12/15 - NYT - UNHCR & WFP will reduce assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan: - The United Nations plans to cut assistance to the 1.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan because most have become economically self-sufficient and more desperate refugees need the aid.

For most Afghan refugees, the aid "is not something that is essential for their lives," Hugh Hudson, a spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner's office in Islamabad, said today.

He said the agency would spend \$20 million on Afghan refugees in 1995, compared with \$26 million this year. About \$6 million of next year's aid will go to Afghans who want to return to their war-torn country.

12/16 - PT - Fighting erupted in Faryab between Dostam & Rabbani forces. The Salang Highway, now apparently under Dostam's control, is essentially closed, but Dostam's foreign relations department said that UN humanitarian supply convoys would be allowed through to Kabul & that other countries could use the highway to transport goods to the Central Asian republics.

12/21 - Associated Press - Hekmatyar met with Benazir Bhutto yesterday to explore peace proposals. Ms. Bhutto met with Rabbani last week in Casablanca. Rabbani is due to step down at the end of December, but as he has already extended his term twice, the chances of his going are remote. Hekmatyar vows to keep fighting until Rabbani steps down. "An estimated 15,000 people have been killed in battles among Muslim factions who turned on each other after they threw out the communists in April 1992 & set up an Islamic gov't. Large swaths of the capital, Kabul, have been destroyed... Pakistan is eager to end the fighting, hoping peace would induce an estimated 1.5m Afghan refugees living in Pakistan to return home."



12/28 - Associated Press - Rabbani extended his term a 3rd time saying, "We are ready to turn over power to a legal authority, but there is no legal authority acceptable to all." He called for a meeting of provincial representatives "as soon as possible" to establish a new gov't. A Hekmatyar spokesman warned that if Rabbani did not step down, "we'll find a way to transfer power." ICRC estimates that over 70,000 people have been killed or wounded in this year's fighting.

12/30 - PT - Amb. Mestiri is starting his 3rd round in Afghanistan. His main focus will be to establish a council, endorsed by the UNGA, in which all groups are represented. Reportedly, the ground work for Rabbani to transfer power to the Supreme Court when Mestiri arrives in Kabul is in place. Mestiri leaves for Kabul tomorrow & has requested all parties to observe a 3-day cease-fire while he is there.

1/3 - PT - Mestiri hopes for a power transfer in Kabul within 10 days.

- Younis Khalis returned to Afghanistan after 19 years in exile in Peshawar. He was welcomed at Torkham by Ningarhar Gov. Abdul Qadeer.



- Associated

Press - Muslim guerrillas took 4 hostages in Kurgovat, a Tajikistan town on the Afghan border. Russian troops rushed in & the resulting firefight lasted several hours. "The Russians are helping the Tajik gov't battle Muslim rebels & guerrillas based in neighboring Afghanistan." Reportedly, 6 Russian soldiers were killed in the fight. Six others died from drinking poisoned champagne (sold near the Dushanbe military base) at a New Year's celebration.

1/4 - PT - Kabul's Security Chief said Rabbani's resignation would not create any security problems in the city. He said, "A system exists which is not affected by a change at the top."

1/9 - Associated Press - Rabbani claimed victory over Hekmatyar in fighting near Ghazni although fighting there continues and the Ghazni-Kabul highway is closed. Kabul has been calm this week as UN officials try to negotiate a peace plan.

1/12 - Associated Press - A Red Cross convoy with 40 tons of medical supplies reached Kabul. Despite the lull in the fighting, hospitals still receive large numbers of patients injured by mines or in accidents. Unless the convoys come, the hospitals cannot operate. While Rabbani holds most of the city, Hekmatyar controls most of the roads into it. The report says that UN officials appear to be making progress in negotiations to form a multi-party interim gov't.

SEMINAR ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Amidst the harrowing and depressing news continuously coming from Afghanistan, one recent development provided a glimpse of hope.

A seminar on Women's Rights was organized by the Department of Human Rights of the Afghani NGO the Co-operation Centre for Afghanistan (CCA) and held in Mazar-e Sharif, from 15-19 Oct. 1994. The seminar was attended by some 500 experts and scholars, university lecturers, representatives of women from Balkh, Kabul, Baghlan and Jauzjan provinces, and delegates of UN agencies and NGO's present in Mazar and Pakistan.

The programme of the first day of the seminar was introduced by Mrs Humaira, Dean Faculty of Law and Political Sciences. Papers on the various aspects of women's rights were then presented by several other female members of Balkh University, chairwomen and representatives of several women's organizations: the Islamic Sisters Association, Women of Jauzjan Province and others.

On the second day, the seminar participants were divided into 6 working groups as follows:

- Group I : Women's Political Rights
- Group II : Women's Cultural Rights
- Group III: Women's Civic and Social Rights
- Group IV : Women and Health
- Group V : Women, Labour and Property
- Group VI : Women and Law

Each working group identified the problems faced by Afghan women during the second day of the seminar. The findings of each group were discussed in a plenary meeting held in the morning of the third day. The groups continued their work in the afternoon separately to find out ways and means of solving the respective problems. On the third day a plenary meeting was held again to study and discuss the previous day's findings. In the afternoon the participants worked on specific recommendations and the resolution of the seminar. Messages were also delivered from the "Peace Train", a Dublin-based organization, and from OXFAM.

During the plenary meeting on the fifth day, discussions were held on the specific recommendations prepared by each workshop to authorities in the country and Party leaders, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, UN agencies and male members of Afghani society. After discussion the meeting agreed to a set of recommendations and adopted a resolution to be considered by relevant groups and individuals.

A task force composed of 18 women was appointed to follow up the practical implementation of the seminar's outcomes. This task force is to set up the nucleus of an independent women's council with the aim of drawing up a plan of action based on the principles emphasized by the seminar.

A report and documents on the seminar are to be published and distributed to relevant organizations in English and Dari in the near future. We shall bring news of any published material, upon receipt, in future issues of the WNB.

Wahdat News Bulletin, Vol.2 No.14

December 1994

Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 37 (e)



STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND
DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: EMERGENCY
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR PEACE, NORMALCY AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR-STRICKEN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Russian Federation, Saudi
Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uzbekistan:
draft resolution

Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy
and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 47/119 of 18 December 1992 and 48/208 of
21 December 1993 concerning emergency international assistance for the
reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, 1/

Wishing the people of Afghanistan peace and prosperity,

Deeply concerned about the massive loss of human life, the destruction of
property and the serious damage to the economic and social infrastructure of
Afghanistan caused by fifteen years of war,

Addendum

Add the following countries to the list of sponsors of the draft
resolution:

Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, China, Costa Rica,
Czech Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Greece, Honduras, India, Iran, (Islamic
Republic of), Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands,
Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan and Yemen

Affirming the readiness of the United Nations to assist the people of
Afghanistan in their effort to resolve internal political differences,
facilitating national rapprochement leading to the restoration of a fully
representative, broad-based government and to the start of the process of
rehabilitation and reconstruction in their country,

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary-General of Mahmoud Mestiri to head the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan and expressing its appreciation for the efforts of the special mission towards the restoration of peace, normalcy and national rapprochement and the objective of reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-stricken Afghanistan,

Expressing its support for the continuing efforts of the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan, particularly the initial steps taken by that mission to begin a political process in which all segments of Afghan society are represented,

Appreciating the efforts of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other international organizations in support of the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan,

Noting with mounting concern the prolongation of armed hostilities among the factions in the country, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians and other violations of international humanitarian law, including those imposing starvation on the civilian population, which have caused significant civilian casualties, displaced populations and destruction of the economic and social infrastructure of the country, in spite of repeated calls by the Security Council and the Secretary-General for a cessation of hostilities,

Deeply concerned about the problem of millions of anti-personnel land-mines in Afghanistan, which continue to prevent many Afghan refugees from returning to their villages and from working in their fields,

Bearing in mind the close interrelationship between the revitalization of the economy and the strengthening of the ability of Afghanistan to take effective steps towards those objectives and the ensuring of peace and normalcy in the country,

Stressing the importance of the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan for the prosperity of its people, who have suffered many hardships during fifteen years of war and devastation and who have lost the opportunity for development throughout the conflict,

Aware that Afghanistan continues to suffer from an extremely critical economic situation as a land-locked, least developed and war-stricken country,

Welcoming with appreciation the efforts of the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the international community to the acute problems of reconstruction in Afghanistan,

Affirming the urgent need to initiate international action to assist Afghanistan in restoring basic services and the infrastructure of the country, and welcoming the efforts of the United Nations Development Programme in this respect,

Appreciating the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in its continuing support for the repatriation of Afghan refugees from neighbouring countries,

Thanking all Governments that have rendered assistance to Afghan refugees, in particular the Governments of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and recognizing the need for international assistance for the voluntary repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons,

Expressing its appreciation to the States and the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that have responded positively and continue to

respond to the humanitarian needs of Afghanistan, as well as to the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative for mobilizing and coordinating the delivery of appropriate humanitarian assistance,

Recalling the statements on Afghanistan of the President of the Security Council of 24 January, 23 March, 11 August and 30 November 1994, 2/

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General 1/ and endorses the observations and recommendations set out therein;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to authorize the special mission established under General Assembly resolution 48/208 to continue its efforts to facilitate national rapprochement and reconstruction in Afghanistan, in particular by promoting the earliest possible establishment of a fully representative and broad-based Authoritative Council with authority:

(a) To negotiate and oversee an immediate and durable cease-fire;

(b) To create and control a national security force to provide for security throughout the country and oversee the collection and safeguarding of all heavy weapons in the country;

(c) To form an acceptable transitional government, which could, inter alia, control the national security force, until conditions for free and fair elections are established throughout the country, possibly utilizing traditional decision-making structures, such as a grand assembly, to help establish those conditions;

3. Calls upon all Afghans, especially the leaders of warring parties, to agree on an immediate cease-fire and a speedy transfer of power, and to support the special mission's efforts to facilitate national reconstruction, expedite the process leading to the speedy establishment of an acceptable transitional government, and restore a fully representative and broad-based government for Afghanistan;

4. Calls upon all States:

(a) To respect Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, strictly to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and to respect the right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny;

(b) To take all steps necessary to promote peace in Afghanistan, to stop the flow of weapons to the parties and to put an end to this destructive conflict;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue efforts to develop plans for national reconstruction and rehabilitation beginning in areas of peace and security, the basis of the recommendations contained in his report; 1/

6. Urgently appeals to all States, organizations and programmes of the United Nations system, specialized agencies and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to provide, on a priority basis, all possible financial, technical and material assistance for the restoration of the basic services and the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, and appeals to the international financial and development institutions to assist in the planning of the reconstruction of Afghanistan;

7. Calls upon the international community to respond to the consolidated appeal for emergency humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan, launched by the Secretary-General for the period from 1 October 1994 to 30 September 1995, having in mind the availability of the Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan".

UN convoy distributes relief goods in Kabul

ISLAMABAD, Dec. 7: A relief convoy of the United Nations is distributing food and other relief goods in the strife-torn Afghan capital, Kabul after a six month period.

According to VOA, the convoy has reached Kabul at a time when people in the capital are in the grip of severe cold weather.

The United Nations is distributing several tons of flour and other edibles among the inhabitants of the city.

The convoy has also carried blankets, medicines and plastic tents so that temporary camps should be set up. The UN officials say that over 30 trucks fully loaded with relief good reached Kabul on Monday.

The relief items are being distributed in the areas occupied by President Burhanuddin Rabbani's troops.

Another relief convoy will go to those southern areas of the city which are under the control of Prime Minister, Gulbadin Hekmatyar's troops.

The UN officials made arrangements for these relief convoys after consulting both the sides.

It may be recalled that troops loyal to Prime Minister, Gulbadin Hekmatyar, have laid siege of the capital and they allow a very small quantity of essential commodities to reach the capital.

Prices of the essential commodi-

ties have gone out of the reach of most of the inhabitants of the city.

It is the first UN relief convoy which has reached Kabul during the last six months. Kabul is destroyed in the fighting which had erupted there on the 1st of January.

An assessment shows that some 7,000 people have lost their lives in the fighting.

Similarly, 21,000 others have lost their limbs in the rocket shelling.—APP PT 12/8

Hekmatyar considering Mestiri's truce call

ISLAMABAD, Dec. 31: The UN peace mission is making preparations to visit Kabul for the first time since last April.

The missions' chief, Mahmood Mestiri has called for a truce in Kabul to make the visit possible.

A BBC commentary said President Rabbani has announced a unilateral ceasefire while the Coordination Council of Gulbadin Hekmatyar says that it is considering the truce call of Mr. Mahmood Mestiri. Representatives of some Afghan groups have now left for Kabul to apprise their leaders about their talks with Mahmood Mestiri.

Mr. Mahmood Mestiri will soon leave for Kabul in case weather conditions are conducive and peace in holding in the Afghan capital. This will be his first visit

to Kabul since last April. Afghan government officials say that they would wait for Mr. Mestiri on Saturday morning. However, the visit may be delayed if fighting erupts again in the city. The situations in Kabul remained calm during last several days.

Mr. Mestiri has called upon the government and the opposition to hold a truce during his visit. President Rabbani had ordered his force last Tuesday to hold a unilateral ceasefire and the Coordination Council of Gulbadin Hekmatyar has also said that it would consider the truce call of Mahmood Mestiri.

The opposition leaders have urged President Rabbani to come to Jalalabad for talks over the transfer of power while the President has invited the opposition parties to send their representatives to Kabul for this purpose.

Both the sides say that they want beginning of a political process for formation of an interim government, effecting a ceasefire and constitution of a permanent government but differences do exist between the two sides over the Modus Operandi for achieving this objective.

Mr. Hekmatyar says that President Rabbani should resign forthwith while the President insists that he would hand over power only to a legal authority. A presidential spokesman has said that the President would transfer power to the Supreme Court but he has delayed it till a meeting with Mahmood Mestiri. The latter will also meet Gulbadin Hekmatyar during his stay in Kabul.—APP PT 1/1/95



Der Kotwali-Durchgang von der Seite des Bazar-e Arg aus gesehen

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ABBREVIATIONS USED



ACBAR	- Agency Coordinating Bureau for Afghan Relief
ARIC	- Afghanistan Resource & Information Centre
BIA	- Bakhtar Information Agency
CSM	- Christian Science Monitor
FBIS	- Foreign Broadcasting Information Service
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
ICRC	- Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT	- Kabul Times
LAT	- Los Angeles Times
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- New York Times
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PCV	- Peace Corps Volunteer
PT	- Pakistan Times
PVO	- Private Voluntary Organization
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNOCA	- United Nations Office of the Commissioner for Afghanistan (sometimes UNOCHA)
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAID	- United States Agency for Int'l Development
WSJ	- Wall Street Journal

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Line drawings from the 1982 calendar of the Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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